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International Policy Coordination: The Case
of the Developing Country Debt Crisis
4.1 Introduction
The LDC debt crisis has differed from other problems in the world
economy in an important and fascinating way. From the beginning of
the crisis, all leading governments have acknowledged the need for an
activist and internationally coordinated policy response. Even the os-
tensibly laissez-faire Reagan Administration went swiftly into action
in August 1982 when the global debt crisis exploded with Mexico's
announcement that it would be unable to meet its international debt
service obligations. Within days, the U.S. government arranged for
billions of dollars of emergency financing for Mexico. Since then, the
U.s. government has taken the lead in managing the international re-
sponse to the crisis, a response that has called for the coordinated
actions of the leading creditor governments, the debtor governments,
the international banks, and the multilateral financial institutions.
The management of the crisis has been only a partial success. On
the positive side, the dire predictions of pessimists in 1982 have not
come to pass: the countries with the largest debts have serviced their
debts and not defaulted; the international commercial banks have re-
mained solvent; the international capital markets have continued to
function and, indeed except for the debtor countries, have expanded
in their scope and functions; and the world has not fallen into a default-
induced depression. These favorable outcomes resulted in significant
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part from the actions ofpolicymakers at key junctures in the past five
years.
On the other hand, the economic results for most of the debtor
countries have been poor. Economic development for hundreds ofmil-
lions of people has been halted or partially reversed. The long-term
adequacy of the current debt strategy therefore remains very much in
doubt, despite the success to datein avoiding a financial crisis. Contrary
to the forecasts of the IMF, the creditor governments, and the com-
mercial banks, the debtor countries have enjoyed neither sustained
recovery nor renewed access to market lending under the current rules
ofthe game. In some countries, the economic situation has become so
desperate that governments have been forced into unilateral morato-
rium on debt servicing, even at the cost of a serious rupture of inter-
national financial relations.
This mix ofsuccess and failure is related to the kind ofinternational
policy coordination advocated and managed by the United States in
recent years. The U.S. government and the otherleading creditorgov-
ernments (including the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany) have
worried more about continued debt servicing to the commercial banks
than about the pace ofeconomic development in the debtor countries.
By opting to use their political and economic influence to bolster their
banks' positions, the creditor governments have been able to sustain
the flow ofdebt payments from the debtor countries, but often at very
high economic and political costs to the debtor countries themselves.
The policy emphasis on debt servicing to·the commercial banks is
not surprising and was certainly not inappropriate in the first couple
of years of the debt crisis. The threat of insolvency of the world's
largest commercial banks was the most serious problem raised by the
debt crisis at its inception. As shown in the data oftable 4.1, the LDC
exposure of the largest U.S. commercial banks greatly exceeded 100
percent ofbank capital at the end of 1982. The same is apparently true
of the largest banks in Europe and Japan, although data on bank ex-
posures and bank capital are not generally available outside of the
United States. Widespread debt repudiations could have easily trig-
gered a global banking crisis, and it was not unreasonable for policy-
makers to fear that such a crisis could have pushed the world from a
deep recession into a deep depression.
Moreover, various analyses suggestedthatifthe short-termproblems
ofthe debt crisis could be contained, then most ofthe debtor countries
had the longer term capacity to resume debt servicing and to restore
economic growth, a viewpoint which has been bolstered by the con-
tinuing decline in world interest rates. Most of these analyses also
stressed, however, the need for a continuing flow of new capital into235 Developing Country Debt
Table 4.1 u.s. Bank Assets in the Debtor Countries (nine major banks)
End-1982 Mid-1984 March 1986
Total Exposure ($ billion)
All LDCs 83.4 84.0 75.6
Latin America 51.2 53.8 52.2
Africa 5.6 4.9 3.6
Exposure as Percent
of Bank Capital
All LDCs 287.7 246.3 173.2
Latin America 176.5 157.8 119.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 19.3 14.3 8.1
Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, "Country Exposure Lend-
ing Survey." End-1982 figures from statistical release of October 15, 1984; March 1986
figures from release of August 1, 1986. Exposures are calculated using data for''total
amounts owed to U.S. banks after adjustments for guarantees and external borrowing."
Total exposures are calculated for all LDCs (OPEC, non-oil Latin America, non-oil Asia,
non-oil Africa); Latin America (non-oil Latin America plus Ecuador and Venezuela);
and Africa (non-oil Africa plus Algeria, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria).
the debtor countries, a need which was widely recognized by policy-
makers but which has not been satisfactorily satisfied.
In the past two years, the nature of the debt management has pro-
voked increasing opposition in the debtor countries, since the debtor
countries have been making large sacrifices but without renewed growth,
and since the spectre ofa global banking crisis has lessened. Moreover,
the worldwide drop in commodities prices since 1985 worsened the
economic situation in many of the debtor countries, as did a further
drying up of bank lending. Several smaller debtor countries have re-
cently rejected the international rules ofthe game and have unilaterally
restricted debt servicing, Peru being the best-known case. The threat
ofa breakdownin continued debt servicing led U.S. TreasurySecretary
James Baker III to propose the "Baker Plan" in October 1985, which
calledfor increasedinflows ofprivate andofficial capital into the debtor
countries in return for internationally supervised policy adjustments in
those countries. However, more than a year after the announcement
ofthe Baker Plan, there is little evidence ofa renewed flow ofprivate
foreign capital into the debtor countries.
This paper reviews the management of the debt crisis to date and
considers several possible alternative approaches for international co-
operation in the future. Section 4.2 briefly reviews the scope of the
crisis and some of the reasons for its onset. Section 4.3 describes the
internationally coordinated policy responses to the crisis. Section 4.4
describes the conceptual underpinnings of this coordinated response,
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success ofthepolicy response. Section4.6 discusses several alternative
measures for the future. Conclusions from the paper are summarized
in section 4.7.
4.2 The Scope and Origins of the LDC Debt Crisis
The basic outlines of the LDC debt crisis are by now very well
known, so only a briefsummary ofthe onsetofthe crisis will be needed
here.! Spokesmen in the developing countries sometimes insist that the
debt crisis arose solely because ofglobal economic dislocations, while
creditorcountry policymakers sometimes suggest that mismanagement
by the debtor countries is entirely to blame for the crisis. The truth is
of course somewhere in the middle. The fact that more than forty
countries simultaneously succumbed to crisis suggests that global fac-
tors were crucial to the onset of the crisis. But the fact that many
countries affected by global shocks avoided a crisis (e.g., most ofthe
debtor nations in East Asia) highlights the importance ofcountry-specific
factors, often involving important policy mistakes, in the onset of the
crisis. We turn first to the global factors in the crisis, then to the
mistakes ofeconomic management in the debtor countries themselves.
4.2.1 Global Factors in the Onset ofthe Crisis
After the bond defaults of the Great Depression, international com-
merciallending to the developing countries virtually disappeared until
the development of cross-border commercial bank lending in Euro-
dollars in the late 1960s.2 During the period 1950 to 1970, foreign direct
investment provided the bulk ofinternational private capital flows, and
private capital flows as a whole were smaller in magnitude than official
flows from the multilateral institutions and from individual creditor
governments. In the early 1970s, private capital flows to the developing
countries began to exceed official flows, as private bank lending rose
to become the dominant form of international capital flow. The sharp
rise in world liquidity during 1971-73, related to overly expansionary
U.S. monetary policies and the demise ofthe fixed exchange rate sys-
tem, contributed to the expansion ofthe Eurodollar market and to an
increase in bank funds available for lending to developing countries.
Thus the rise in international bank lending predated the first OPEC oil
shock of late 1973.
The first OPEC shock in 1973 dramatically increased the pace of
LDC bank lending, as the new savings of the Persian Gulf countries
were channeled to the international commercial banks, which lent (or
"recycled") these savings to the developing countries. This burst of
lending was not simply the result of oil-importing countries trying to
maintain their real consumption levels after the rise in oil prices, as is237 Developing Country Debt
sometimes suggested. Indeed, many oil exporting LDCs outside ofthe
Persian Gulf (i.e., countries such as Mexico and Nigeria) borrowed
substantially from the international banks, so that by 1983, after the
enormous rise in real oil prices during the previous decade, the top ten
developing country debtors, as a group, were oil exporters.3
Most ofthe international lending during this period was undertaken
by official borrowers (i.e., central governments, public sector devel-
opment banks, parastatals, etc.) rather than by the private sector, though
the proportion ofpublic and private borrowing differed by country. In
many cases, the borrowing was used to finance ambitious public sector
investment programs that could now be funded with readily available
international bank credits at low real interest rates. The strategy of a
rapid growth takeoff, based on foreign financing of large-scale public
investments, has been termed "indebted industrialization" by Friedan
(1981), who has studied the politics of this strategy in some detail in
the cases of Brazil, Korea, and Mexico.
An idea ofthe share ofpublic and private borrowing can be gleaned
from the World Bank Debt Tables, which separates public sector and
publicly guaranteed borrowing from private sector borrowing (the World
Bank data refer only to medium-term and long-term debt, since the
data do not provide a breakdown of the short-term debt by kind of
borrowing). For Latin America as a whole, about three-fourths of all
long-term borrowing at the end of 1978 and also at the end of 1983 was
public or publicly guaranteed. Note that this ratio might be biased
upward to some extent because debts contracted by the public sector
are probably more completely covered by the World Bank Debt Re-
porting Service than are debts contracted by the private sector.
The fact that the external debt is heavily concentrated in the public
sector has had profound implications for.adjustment to the debt crisis
by the debtor countries. As I stress later, these countries have two
fundamental problems to overcome. The first, and most widely rec-
ognized, is that oftransferring national income (via trade surpluses) to
theforeign creditors. The secondproblem, which is perhaps as difficult,
is that of transferring income from the private sector of the debtor
country to the public sector so that the public sector may service its
debts. In many countries, the nation as a whole does not lack the
resources to pay the foreign creditors, but rather the public sector is
unable or unwilling to tax the private sector sufficiently to generate an
adequate debt-servicing capacity.
As of 1979 the pace of international lending did not seem to pose a
particular danger to the banks or to the world economy. Various debt
indicators, such as the popular debt-export ratio, gave very few signs
of danger. Exports from the borrowing countries were booming, so
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1980 despite the jump in total debt ofthe non-oil developing countries
(hereafter NOLDC's) from $130.1 billion in 1973 to $474 billion in 1980.
With this happy state of affairs, international financial specialists, ac-
ademics, and policymakers welcomed the continued "recycling" of
OPEC money and worried little about a debt crisis.
The key to this happy state ofaffairs was that nominal interest rates
on dollar loans were consistently below the rate of growth of dollar
export earnings of the borrowing countries (or, to put it another way,
real interest rates were consistently below the rate of growth of real
export earnings). In 1979, for example, as shown in table 4.2(a) and
(b), nominal U.S. interest rates averaged 11.2 percent, while the export
earnings ofthe LDC nonfuel exporters grew by 27.1 percent. In these
circumstances, a debtor country can borrow all the money that it needs
for debt servicing (i.e., all ofthe interest and amortization due) without
experiencing a rise in its debt-export ratio.4
However, if nominal interest rates exceed the growth of nominal
export earnings, then a country that borrows all the money it needs
for debt servicing will experience an ever-increasing debt-export ratio.
Sooner or later, the country will be cut off from new borrowing, and
it will have to pay for its debt servicing out ofits own resources (i.e.,
by running trade surpluses). With nominal interest rates in the mid-to-
late 1970s at 10 percent or so, and with LDC export earnings growing
at more than 15 percent per year in dollar terms, debt-export ratios
were easily kept under control. Very few observers suspected that in
the near future the debtor countries would suddenly have to shift from
new borrowing to trade surpluses as the way to meet their debt-servicing
needs.
The second, devastating phase ofinternational borrowing took place
in 1980-82, after the heady and highly profitable experience of 1973-
79. Almost none of the relevant actors, neither borrowers nor lenders
(nor, it should be said, academic observers) understood quickly enough
that the success ofthe first period was built squarely on the temporary
condition of low interest rates and high growth in export earnings.
Prudent debtors and bankers should surely have expected that within
a few years interest rates might rise to exceed growth rates, but few
could have anticipated the sudden and dramatic turnaround in the in-
terest rate/earnings growth relation after 1980, which is shown in figure
4.1 and in the data of table 4.1.
The debt crisis followed relentlessly upon the rise in interest rates
and the collapse in export earnings. Once this reversal took place, all
of the debt warning signs started to fly off of the charts, as seen by
the rapid increase in the debt-export and debt-service ratios after 1979
(table 4.2[d] and [e]). Bank lending itselfdropped off, with gross Bank













1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Interest rates and annual percentage change in non-oil LDC
export earnings. Source: 1976-79 "non-oil" LDCs export
value growth, year over year, from IMF, World Economic
Outlook, June 1981; 1980-85 "non-fuel exporter" LDCs ex-
port value growth, year over year, from the IMF, World
Economic Outlook, April 1986. Interest rates are U.S. Trea-
sury bills, 3-month.
the rate of 24 percent in 1980, 18 percent in 1981, and 7 percent in
1982, but the growth in export values declined even more sharply, from
26 percent in 1980, to 5 percent in 1981, and -4 percent in 1982.
Consequently, the debt-export ratio rose quickly.
As is well known, the rise in interest rates had an especially pro-
nouncedeffectbecauseofthe nature ofthe LDC debtto the commercial
banks, most ofwhich was in the form ofmedium-term (generally three
to seven years) rollover credits, with interest rates at a fixed spread
overa short-term reference rate (such as the London Interbank Offered
Rate [LIBOR], or the U.S. prime rate). Thus, just as soon as short-
term interest rates rose at the end of 1979, the interest rates charged
on the existing syndicated bank loans to the LDCs rose by the same
amount. Also, since the great bulk ofthe debt was dollar denominated,
the rise in the dollar exchange rate (and the consequent fall in dollar
prices of internationally traded commodities) was especially painful.
The reasons for the rise in interest rates and fall in the dollar value
of trade have been widely discussed. After the second OPEC price
shock, the leading industrial countries embarked on a widely endorsed
policy ofrapid disinflation, based on very tight monetary policies which
raised interest rates around the world. No international organization,
not the IMF nor the World Bank nor the OECD, gave any hint at the
time that the suddenness and sharpness of the monetary tightening
would be problematic. To the contrary, international officials every-
where applauded the seriousness ofpurpose ofthe anti-inflation fight.242 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
The rise in interest rates was particularly large in the V nited States in
1981 and after, because in addition to tight monetary policies there was
the prospect of many years of large budget deficits caused by the tax
cuts of 1981. As is now well understood, the especially high V.S.
interest rates created a capital inflow into the United States and a sharp
appreciation of the dollar.
4.2.2 The Role ofDomestic Policies in the Onset of the Crisis
Without the global shocks, the debt crisis would not have occurred.
However, in almost all countries that succumbed to an external debt
crisis, domestic policy mistakes also played an important role, a point
which makes commercial bank lending (especially after 1979) harder
to understand, since the banks should have seen some of the policy
disarray in these countries. Some economies thatfaced severe external
disturbances, suchas SouthKoreaandThailand, were able to surmount
the shocks and maintain international creditworthiness and growth, at
least after a shortinterval. Othereconomies, which actually could have
benefited onbalance from the external events, such as the oil-exporters
Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela, collapsed under the weight ofhigher
world interest rates. What were the crucial differences that led to suc-
cessful adjustment in some cases but not in others?
In a recent paper (Sachs 1985), I explored some of the possible
differences by looking at the experiences of the Latin American and
the East Asian debtor countries. Among the major Latin American
countries, all but Colombia succumbed to a foreign debt crisis (as
indicated by the need for a commercial bank debt rescheduling and by
the exclusion from continued borrowing on normal market terms), while
in Asia all of the countries avoided the need for a bank rescheduling
with the exception of the Philippines. Interestingly, the differences in
experience were not fundamentally due to the differences in the size
ofthe external shocks hitting the two regions. As an example, Mexico's
debt crisis arose despite a nearly fourfold increase in export earnings
(due to oil) during 1978 to 1982, so that Mexico benefited rather than
suffered from the commodity price movements in the years pres;eding
the debt crisis. Rather, as stressed also by Balassa(1984) among others,
the orientation of trade policy and exchange rate policy was vital.
Countries with export-promoting trade policies were far more suc-
cessful in surmounting the external shocks. And, not sufficiently stressed
in the 1985 paper, the short-run policy responses after 1979 were vital:
a quick reaction to the change in the international environment was
necessary for a successful adjustment.
The key economic difference in the two regions is the rapid export
growth in Asia, which kept down that region's debt-export ratios. The
export-orientation of the Asian economies, in contrast to the import-243 Developing Country Debt
substitution strategy in Latin America, is well known and well docu-
mented. It should be stressed that the export orientation ofthe Asian
countries is decidedly a matter of policy choice rather than inherent
structure, since two ofthe leading examples ofexport-led growth (South
Korea and Indonesia) went through a Latin-American-styled, import-
substitution phase in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with the result
that exports were stifled and growth was retarded. Incredibly, South
Korean exports were a mere 3percent ofGNP in 1960, compared with
37 percent ofGNP in 1983. Indonesian exports rose from 5 percent of
GNP in 1965 to 23 percent of GNP in 1983!
In addition to the question oflong-term economic policy orientation,
the external shocks imposed serious challenges for short-run policy
after 1979. The rise in world interest rates placed direct and significant
pressures on government budgets because ofthe rise in debt-servicing
costs on both foreign and domestic debt (domestic debt in most coun-
tries experienced a rise in interest rates in response to the rise in world
rates). It also provoked capital outflows and reserve losses in countries
with fixed exchange rates (virtually all of the developing countries at
the time). Exports dropped as world trade slowed, and investments
fell in response to higher interest rates. Thus aggregate demand and
employment tended to fall, at the same time that deficits were rising
and foreign reserves were falling. The freedom ofaction for both mon-
etary and fiscal policy was therefore extremely limited.
In Asia, budget deficits were kept under control and exchange rates
were devalued after 1979 in response to these shocks (remarkably,
Indonesia took a preventative devaluation to spur non-oil exports in
1978, in the belief that oil exports would remain weak). Starting from
a diversified export base, these policy changes in Asia caused a fairly
quick rise in the region's export volumes. Also, both policies helped
these countries to avoid the problem of capital flight, which tends to
occur in anticipation ofa currency devaluation, an anticipation that in
turn is naturally raised by large budget deficits.
In Latin America, the story is almost the opposite. In almost all of
the countries concerned (certainly including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela) the exchange rate was allowed to
become substantially overvalued during 1979 to 1981, with the result
that export growth in the early 1980s was meagre. Brazil was the
important exception to the exchange rate overvaluation, and it alone
enjoyed an export boom between 1981 and 1984. To the extent that the
Latin American governments endeavoured to maintain economic growth,
they did so mainly through expansionary fiscal policy, which exacer-
bated the budget deficits that were already bulging because of higher
interest payments on home and foreign debt. Money financing of the
budgetdeficits increasedin many countries, with the resultofenormous244 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
capital outflows and reserve losses during 1981 and 1982. After the
reserves and access to borrowing ran out in 1982, the continuation of
money-financed deficits led to sharp currency depreciations and an
explosion ofinflation (with triple-digit inflations in Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Peru, and now, in 1986, Mexico).
The data in table 4.3 show the differences in real exchange rates of
the two regions (vis-a-vis the V.S.) during the years building up to the
crisis. The real exchange rate is measured here as the country's con-
sumer price level relative to the V.S. consumer price level, adjusted
for exchange rate changes. A value above 100 signifies a real appre-
ciation after 1978, implying that the country's goods and labor became
relatively expensive in international markets. The results of these ex-
change rate policies are reflected in the superior export performance
of the Asian economies, as shown by the annual changes in export






















4.2.3 The Collapse of Bank Lending in 1982
The warning signs ofimpending crisis were everywhere in 1981 but
were virtually ignored. World interest rates were at historic highs and
international trade was stagnant. Several countries, including Bolivia,
Jamaica, Peru, Poland, and Turkey were already in serious debt diffi-
culties by the end of 1980. By the end of 1981, massive capital flight
Table 4.3 Real Exchange Rate Behavior, Selected Countries (1978 = 100)
Average
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 (1980-81)
Latin America
Argentina 100 141 179 138 59 159
Brazil 100 92 76 80 77 78
Chile 100 102 116 126 100 121
Mexico 100 106 117 127 85 122
Venezuela 101 108 114 118 112
100
East Asia
Indonesia 100 78 81 81 80 81
Malaysia 100 99 93 87 86 90
South Korea 100 106 96 94 89 95
Thailand 100 101 104 99 93 102
Source: IMP, International Financial Statistics.
Note: The real exchange rate is calculated as PIEP*, where P is the CPI, E is theexchange
rate in units of currency per $US, and p* is the U.S. CPI. A rise in the index signifies
a currency appreciation.245 Developing Country Debt
was occurring in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela as unrealistic ex-
change rates came under attack, and as large domestic budget deficits
(particularly in ArgentinaandMexico)fed a rapidincreasein the money
supply. According to one estimate, by the end of 1983, cumulative
capital flight accounted for 61 percent of Argentina's gross external
debt, 44 percentofMexico's debt, and 77 percentofVenezuela's debt.5
Ifthe banks could be excused for their lending during 1973-79, it is
much harder to justify a veritable explosion of bank lending to Latin
America in the circumstances of 1980-82. Latin Americans by the
thousands were lining up at their local banks to take money out oftheir
countries during 1981 and 1982 at the same time the commercial banks
were shoveling the money in. High-ranking Mexican officials have re-
counted, offthe record, that at the end of 1981 Mexico had decided to
undertake a desperately needed devaluation, butwas discouragedfrom
doing so by a leading New York bank, which assured the Mexican
government that a large line of credit would be available to the gov-
ernment to continue to defend the prevailing parity.
Thus, as shown in table 4.4, the net claims ofinternational banks on
Mexico virtually doubled in the two years between the end of 1979 and
the end of 1981, and the net claims more than doubled for Argentina.
The combined claims on the three large debtors-Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico-almost doubled in the two-year period, increasing by $48
billion. InAsia, only thenetclaimsonSouth Koreaincreasedmarkedly,
and then from a much lower level than in Latin America.
By early 1982, the international commercial banks began to under-
stand the longer term implications of the rise in world interest rates
and the fall in export growth rates. Projections of debt-export ratios
prepared in these new international circumstances showed that·the
debt-export ratios ofthe developing countries would rise rapidly in the
near future unless these countries shifted toward a trade surplus,
Table 4.4 Net Liabilities of Countries to International Banks in the HIS









South Korea 7.2 13.7
Thailand 1.6 1.8
Subtotal 7.4 14.2
Source: BIS.246 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
something that was hard to imagine at the time. Bank jitters were
increasedby thegrowing numberofcountries with" special" problems,
such as Poland in 1981, and Argentina (at war in the Falklands) in the
spring of1982. Banks also came to appreciate the possibility ofa classic
liquidity squeeze. Given the buildup of debt and the large share that
was short term, the total debt servicing due in 1982 (including all short-
term debt as well as amortizations and interest on medium-term and
long-term debt) came to exceed 100 percent of exports in 1982 for
several Latin countries, though not for the Asian countries. Taking the
average debt service to export ratios for 1980-83 for the two regions,
we see the difference in table 4.5. Thus, a cessation of new lending
(including an inability to roll over short-term debts) would inevitably
force the Latin countries into a moratorium on debt servicing, even if
all of their exports were to be used for that purpose!
Mexico, ofcourse, set offthe global shock in 1982. In the beginning
of 1982, Mexico finally devalued its grossly overvalued currency, but
then almost immediately lost international confidence by giving a large
public sector wage increase as compensation for the devaluation. The
budget deficit remained enormous (an estimated 17.6 percent of GDP
in 1982), meaning that even the new pegged level would soon become
unsustainable. In the spring of 1982, Mexico canvassed the banking
community for a new large international loan, but received a cool
response. International reserves fell sharply throughout the spring and
summer, and the Mexican public speculated against the new exchange
rate. Unable to win bank confidence under these unsettled circum-
stances, the Mexican government took several remarkable steps in
August, including: a freezing of dollar accounts in Mexican banks; a
renewed depreciation of the currency under a new dual-rate system;
an imposition of new exchange controls; and most important, a dec-
laration of a temporary suspension of debt-service payments. Soon
thereafter, in a parting shot, outgoing MexicanPresident Lopez Portillo
nationalized the Mexican banks.



















Source: Sachs (1985, table 4, p. 533).247 Developing Country Debt
These events of course stopped all new lending to Mexico, and the
drop in lending rapidly spread to the other debtor countries, especially
in Latin America. In quick response, more than a dozen debtor coun-
tries began negotiations with the banks and the official bilateral cred-
itors on rescheduling debt payments for 1982 and 1983. The list of
reschedulers eventually ran up to more than forty countries.
4.3 The Creditor Response to the Debt Crisis
So far we have established, in rough terms, how the debt crisis arose.
Now we turn to the international policy response to the crisis itself.
The theme of this section is that a credit crisis poses certain key and
identifiable needs for international coordination and that, to an impor-
tant extent, such needs were fulfilled by international policy coordi-
nation. The style ofinternational management was set first in the Mex-
ican bailout of 1982.
4.3.1 The 1982 Mexican Bailout
The events in Mexico prompted strongand almost immediate actions
in support of Mexico from the official international financial commu-
nity, under the leadership ofthe U.S. government, especially the U.S.
Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board. Within days of Mexico's
announcement ofa suspension in debt servicing, the following actions
were taken: (1) the U.S. government committed nearly $3 billion to
Mexico, including $1 billion in prepayments for oil purchases for the
strategic petroleum reserve, $1 billion in finance ofagricultural exports
to Mexico from the Commodity Credit Corporation, and a $925 million
bridge loan from the Federal Reserve Board; (2) the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements extended a bridge loan to Mexico of nearly $1
billion; (3) the export credit agencies ofthe leading creditor countries
agreed to increase their lending to Mexico by $2 billion; and (4) talks
got underway for a large IMF loan. By November 1982, the IMF agree-
ment was reached, providingfor $3.7 billion oflending overthree years.
The IMFagreementcalled for budget and monetaryausterity in Mexico
in view of the country's reduced access to foreign borrowing. In the
following year, Mexico rescheduled it debts with its official creditors
in the Paris Club forum.
Thegreatnovelty ofthe IMFagreementwas to linkthe IMFfinancing
to new lending from Mexico's bank creditors. The IMP declared that
it would put new money into Mexico only ifthe existing bank creditors
also increased their loan exposure. The requisite agreement with the
commercial banks took effect in early 1983. The bank agreement called
for a rescheduling ofMexico's existing debts falling due between Au-
gust 1982 and December 1984 (the term of the IMF program), as well
as a new loan of $5 billion, to be extended by the existing banks in248 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
proportion to their existing exposure. The rescheduling provided for
continuedand timely payments ofinterestonmarketterms onMexico's
existing debts, and in fact the spread over LIBOR on Mexican debt
was increased in the agreement. Thus, in present value terms there
was no sacrifice made by the banks in the debt rescheduling or in the
new loan, assuming that both would continue to be serviced.
Moreover, under prevailing accounting conventions, the U.S. banks
would not have to show any loss at all under the rescheduling agree-
ment, since what is crucial for income accounting for the banks is the
continued and timely servicing of interest on the loan, not principal.
Indeed, the rise in spreads on Mexico's rescheduled debts meant that
the banks would report higher, not lower, income as a result of the
rescheduling operation. This concern ofU.S. bank accounting with the
interest flow on bank claims, ratherthan with changes in the underlying
values ofthe claims, helps to explain the single-minded concern in the
bank agreements with a continued and timely servicing ofinterest: no
interest relief, then no loss of short-term propts.
In the discussion that follows, I will use the terms "debt relief" or
"debtforgiveness" for arrangements thatreduce in presentvalue terms
the contractual obligations on debt repayments. The term "debt res-
cheduling" will be taken to imply (as in the Mexican program) a post-
ponement of repayments, but one that maintains the present value of
contractual debt-servicing obligations.
4.3.2 Generalizing the Mexican Example
The Mexican program was rather quickly improvised, but it never-
theless became the norm for the dozens ofreschedulings thatfollowed.
Like the Mexican program, virtually all ofthe debt restructurings have
had the following characteristics:
• The IMP has made high-conditionality loans to the debtor govern-
ment, always contingentona reschedulingagreementbeing reached
between the country and the commercial banks;
• The commercial banks have rescheduled existing claims by stretch-
ing out principal repayments, but without reducing the contractual
present value of repayments;
• The debtor countries have agreed to maintain timely servicing of
interest payments on all commercial bank loans;
• The banks have made their reschedulings contingent on an IMF
agreement being in place;
• The official creditors have rescheduled their claims in the Paris
Club setting, and have also made such reschedulings contingent on
an IMP agreement.
While it has been true that all bank reschedulings have preserved the
contractual present value of the bank's claims, only some of the re-249 Developing Country Debt
scheduling agreements have involved concerted lending. The amounts
involved in the concerted lending dropped significantly in 1985 and
revived only partially in 1986, entirely on the basis of a new loan to
Mexico, as shown by the data in table 4.6. The fall off in concerted
lending occurred not because of diminished needs for such loans, but
because the banks have strongly resisted new lending in the past two
years except in cases when default appeared to be a plausible alter-
native for the country in question (such as Mexico in 1986).
In cases with concerted lending, the packages have followed the
initial Mexican pattern:
• Explicit backing for the loan by the IMF and U.S. government,
often with pressure exerted on the banks by the U.S. Treasury and
the IMF Managing Director;
• A pro rata allocation of the new loan among the existing banks,
with a possible proviso excluding the smallest ofthe bankcreditors;
• A linkage ofthe bank loan to the debtor country's compliance with
an IMF agreement.
In addition to orchestratingthe relationship betweenthe debtorcoun-
tries and the banks, viathe IMF, the creditorgovernments also confront
the debtor countries directly as official bilateral creditors, mainly through
export credit agencies. For the most heavily indebted countries, most
external debt (about three-fourths of the total) is owed to commercial
banks and other private creditors, but for many ofthe smaller debtors,
especially those with lower per capita income levels, much more than
halfofthe debt has been extended by official creditors, often at conces-
sional terms.6 In general, official lending to the heavily indebted coun-
tries did not decline in the years after 1982, though there is some hint
in the data ofa slowdown ofofficial bilateral lending in 1985 and after.
Official bilateral debt (but not the debt ofthe multilateral institutions)
is rescheduled in the Paris Club setting. Paris Club reschedulings differ
from commercial bank reschedulings in two important ways. First,
reschedulings of debt in the Paris Club often represent a form of for-
giveness, since some ofthe debt in question is already set at a conces-
sional interest rate. Second, the Paris Club does not object as a rule
to rescheduling part or all ofthe interest payments due, something that
is an anathemato the commercial banks. This discrepancy is consistent
with the overall strategy of the creditor country governments, which
is not to maximize debt-service payments by the debtor countries but
rather to protect the servicing of interest on the bank debt.
The World Bank and the multilateral development banks (MDBs) are
the other major actors in the international management of the debt
crisis, and their role has been growing under pressure from the United
States since 1985. The World Bank has recently increased its lending
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ofan elaborate package including IMF, commercial bank, and creditor
government loans (as in the 1986 Mexican package). The role for the
World Bank is expanding under two pressures. First, the direct lending
ofthe IMF is somewhat constrained, as many ofthe important debtor
countries are near their ceilings on drawings from the IMF and, in fact,
will be net repayers to the IMF in the next three years. Second, as the
problems of the debtor countries are increasingly seen as structural
and medium term (rather than simply reflecting a short-run liquidity
squeeze), the long-term development finance ofthe World Bank is seen
as increasingly relevant.
One substantive change in World Bank lending since the onset ofthe
debt crisis is the shift from project lending to so-called policy-based
lending. In policy-based lending, money is made available to facilitate
policy changes on a sectoral or national level, mainly involving the
liberalization of internal and external markets. In March 1986, the
World Bank Executive Directors expressed supportfor a rise in policy-
based lending to between 15 and 20 percent ofall World Bank lending
during 1986-88, up from around 10 percent in the early 1980s. For the
heavily indebted developing countries, policy-based lending accounted
for as much as 35 percent of all lending by the World Bank to the
countries during 1986. A second substantive change in World Bank
lending is the increasingresortto cofinancingarrangements with private
sector creditors as a way to stimulate new private lending via new
public lending.
The regional multilateral development banks (Asian Development
Bank, African DevelopmentBank, Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank)
are also attempting to increase their lending to the heavily indebted
countries in conjunction with increased World Bank lending. In fact,
these MDBs have had great difficulty in disbursing more loans in the
past two years because MDB lending generally requires counterpart
funding from the developing country itself, much of which has been
dropped from austerity budgets. In fact, despite the extensive talk of
increased public lending in recent years, the combined loans of the
World Bank and the MDBs have grown rather slowly since 1980. To
the fifteen largest debtor countries, the net disbursements per year
have risen from $2.1 billion in 1980 to $3.7 billion in 1985, a rather
meagre increase of $1.6 billion.7
4.4 The Conceptual Basis of the Debt Management Strategy
An interesting aspect of the management of the debt crisis is one
thing that did not happen: no leading official in the Reagan Adminis-
tration or in other leading creditor governments said that the crisis was
a matter for the private markets only, with no role for government253 Developing Country Debt
intervention. From the very first days of Mexico's August 1982 crisis
until now, the U.S. government has been deeply involved in managing
the crisis. One reason for this involvement was gut fear. At the end of
1982, the LDC exposure of the nine U.S. money-center banks was
$83.4 billion, or 287.7 percent ofbank capital (see table 4.1). In Latin
America alone, the exposure was 176.5 percent of bank capital, and
more than 70 percentofthat was to Brazil and Mexico alone. It seemed
obvious that ifthe largest debtorcountries unilaterally repudiated their
debt, then the largest U.S. banks could fail, with dire consequences
for the U.S. and world economies. The creditor governments therefore
recognized the importanceofcontinueddebt servicing and were willing
to provide official financing for that purpose. But the motivation for
official management of the crisis went deeper than fear, and that was
the widely shared assumption, anchored in the experience ofthe Great
Depression, that one can't simply "leave it to the markets" in the case
of a financial crisis.
The policymakers took the view that the debt crisis reflected a short-
termto medium-termliquidity squeeze, ratherthanafundamental prob-
lem of solvency. It was felt from the beginning that ifthe debtor coun-
tries could be nursed along for a few years without a breakdown ofthe
system, they would enjoy an economic recovery and be able to resume
normal debt servicing and normal borrowing from the international
capital markets. This conclusion, which must be tested on a country-
by-countrybasis (since thereareclearly somecountrieswhere solvency
is really at stake), has been reached by a numberofanalysts, including
Cline (1984), Cohen (1985), and Feldstein (1986).
For all ofthese analysts, the basic point is the same. Since the debt
ofa typical Latin American debtor country stands at about 70 percent
of GNP, the interest charges on that debt represent approximately 5-
7 percent ofGNP (with an interest rate of8-10 percent per year). This
is a heavy, but not insurmountable, burden for a debtor country, par-
ticularly for a growing debtor country. With growth, the debt-GNP
ratio ofthe country can be stabilized, even ifthe country does not pay
the full interest burden but only the interest burden net ofthe growth
rate of the economy. For an economy growing in dollar terms at 5
percent per year, the annual net interest burden is reduced to perhaps
2-4 percent ofGNP, with the country borrowing approximately 2 per-
cent ofGNP in new loans each year.
While calculations such as these oversimplify the problemsfacing the
debtor countries, they do highlight the potential for a long-term suc-
cessful resolution ofthe crisis.8 As viewed from the perspective ofthe
creditor governments and the IMF, the problem is one of surmounting
the short-termemergencyproblemswithoutaneconomiccollapsein the
debtor countries and without a breakdown in debtor-creditor relations.254 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
In this regard, the policymakers ofthe creditor countries recognized three
distinct areas for international policy coordination. First, it was well
understood that international loan agreements are difficult to enforce,
so official pressures would be needed in order to keep countries from
repudiating their debts. Second, ifleft on their own, the private inter-
national lenders would tend to withdraw too abruptly from the debtor
countries, to the detrimentofboththe borrowers andthe lenders. Third,
the increased lending would have to be conditioned on better macro-
economic policies in the debtor countries. Only official institutions, rather
than the private market, could arrange, monitor, and enforce such con-
ditionality. Thecreditorgovernmentsdid notofcoursealways recognize
the precise implications of these problems. There are good reasons to
believe that enforcement ofdebt servicing has been too strict; that new
lending has been inadequate; and thatconditionality has lacked finesse.
Buttogive duepraise, the United Statesand othercreditorcountrygov-
ernments quickly recognized the need for official action and usually for
the right reasons.
In any event, let us turn to a more detailed discussion ofthese three
areas of public policy intervention.
4.4.1 Enforcement of International Loan Agreements
The creditor governments have played a major role in recent years
in raising the costs ofdebt default for the debtor countries. The leading
governments have steadfastly opposed all forms ofdebt forgiveness or
moratoriums on debt payments, no matter how dire the situation in a
debtor country. The IMF, pushed no doubt by the U.S. Treasury, has
insisted that all IMF programs be based on the commitment ofdebtor
countries to complete servicing, at market rates, ofthe interest on their
commercial bank debts. Countries refusing to abide by this dictate risk
forfeiting an IMF program, which is in turn the admission ticket for
bank debt reschedulings, Paris Club reschedulings, and new lending
from other multilateral lenders. They also risk the foreign policy dis-
pleasure ofthe creditor nations, and they fear the adverse reaction on
private sector investors of stirring up that displeasure. It should be
noted that such foreign policy''displeasure" canjeopardize the coun-
try's foreign relations with the creditor governments in a wide variety
of areas, including military support, arms sales, trade policies, tech-
nology transfers, and foreign aid.
Later in the paper I question whether the creditorgovernments have
pushed too far in support of full debt servicing. This is not easy to
answer since two competing objectives are at stake. The higher the
penalty of default, the safer international lending will be in general,
and the easier it will be for debtor governments to obtain loans. On
the other hand, when a debtor gets into trouble, a lower penalty is255 Developing Country Debt
important as a kind ofinsurance or safety valve, to prevent too large
a collapse of debtor country living standards. The opposition of the
U.S. government to a debt moratorium in any of the major debtor
cou~trieswas probably crucial to avoidance ofa banking crisis in 1982
and 1983. Moreover, the fact that loans are still being serviced today
is important for the future viability of the international loan market
(which could hardly exist ifloans became unenforceable). On the other
hand, for some countries the enforcement has gone too far: the absence
ofthe safety valve has forced some countries into situations ofextreme
economic misery and social instability.
4.4.2 Encouragement of International Lending
Thecreditorgovernments also recognized a secondrole: encouraging
new lending from the private markets and from official sources. When
a debtor is in financial distress, individual creditors have an incentive
to withdraw credits even when collectively it is in the creditors' inter-
ests to continue to make loans. The collective withdrawal of credits
can even provoke a default, with all ofthe attendant inefficiencies and
costs, just as a panicked withdrawal of bank deposits can cause a
healthy bank to fall victim to a run (see Sachs 1984 for a more formal
discussion of this point). This kind of behavior is well recognized in
the context of domestic bankruptcy law (especially in corporate reor-
ganization), which stops individual creditors from collecting on their
claims and thereby enforces collective decision-making by the credi-
tors. In this sense, the IMFpressurefor concertedlending played some
of the role of the bankruptcy code in a corporate reorganization.
The possibility that banks might cause a "run" on a country, just as
bank depositors might cause a run on a bank, was heightened by a fact
thatwe notedearlier: debtserviceto exportratios exceeded 100 percent
in 1982 for many of the Latin American countries. This meant that a
freezing up in lending by any substantial group of banks would force
these countries into a unilateral suspension of debt servicing. This
vulnerability by itself became a good reason not to lend to the region
after mid-1982. Even ifan individual bank felt that Mexico's long-term
prospects were good, it would not make sense to lend if the bank felt
that other banks might soon be withdrawing their credits. Moreover,
many ofthe traditional riskindicators (e.g., the debt-exportratio) began
to flash red in 1982, so it was rational for any lender to fear that other
lenders would soon stop lending.
This reasoning has been central to the IMP's insistence on concerted
lending by the commercial banks. The IMF has insisted that the debtor
countries have the long-term capacity to repay their loans and arejust
stuckin a short-termcredit squeeze. TheIMFalso recognized correctly
thatevenifeach bankagreed with such reasoning, there is no guarantee256 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
that the loan market on its own would spontaneously provide sufficient
capital to the debtor countries.
Concerted lending takes place without legal compulsion, as individ-
ual banks have to agree to sign on to the cooperative agreement. Eco-
nomic theory predicts, and experience confirms, that such a situation
gives enormous bargaining power to the smaller banks, who know that
their small contribution ofmoney will not make an economic difference
to the debtor country, and who can therefore threaten to "free ride"
on the lending decisions of the bigger banks. Indeed, it has been hard
to keep the smaller regional banks in the concerted lending game. In
some cases, the large banks have agreed to contribute the share of
some of the smaller banks to make an agreement sail. In other cases,
the initial concerted lending package is designed solely for the largest
creditor banks. An illustration ofthe "exploitation ofthe large by the
small" is shown in figure 4.2, reproduced from Sachs (1984), which
shows the contributions of large and small banks to a concerted loan
package to Brazil in 1983. As seen in the figure, the smaller banks were
able and eager to escape from new lending.
The same kind ofneed for coordination ofthe creditors arises, even
more acutely, when the debtor is truly insolvent. In that case there will
again be a natural scramble ofcreditors to get out ofthe country, even
if the resulting decapitalization of the country depresses the overall
debt-servicing capacity ofthe country to the detriment ofthe creditors
collectively. Assets will be removed from the country even ifthey earn
more than the market return, because the individual creditor knows
that he will not receive the asset's full return in any event, since it will
have to be shared with the other creditors (and perhaps on a "first
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way to reduce the value of the debt or to convert it to equity, as in a
bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor will inevitably be forced into an
involuntary default, with the attendant inefficiencies of lawsuits and
restrictions on international trade, and the absence of new financing
for worthwhile new investment projects.
Note that merely because a debtor government has a negative net
worth does not mean that it doesn't have many worthwhile new in-
vestment projects, each of which individually would meet the market
test. These projects simply cannot be financed until the existing ov-
erhang of debt is resolved, which can occur in one of three ways: (1)
the existing creditors canagree to write down some ofthedebt, perhaps
taking an equity position in the debtor; (2) the existing creditors could
agree jointly to finance the new project and share in the net returns;
or (3) the existing creditors could agree to give senior status to a new
creditor, who would finance the project on the basis that the new loan
would be repaid in advance ofthe previous debt. In any ofthese cases
(which are all familiar from bankruptcy law), official intervention will
probably be needed to help the creditors arrive at a consensual agree-
ment that will allow the investment to go forward.
4.4.3 The Conditionality Problem
The creditor governments recognized a third reason forjoint action:
the fact that the new lending would, at least to some extent, have to
be predicated on improved macroeconomic performance in the debtor
countries. To illustrate this role for policy intervention (in this case
intervention by the IMF and to a lesser extent the World Bank), con-
sider a country that would be in default in the absence ofa new loan.
Suppose that the new loan will be repaid only ifit is usedfor investment
purposes, not for consumption purposes. The country would prefer to
receive the loan and to invest rather than simply to default. However,
best of all, it would like to get the new loan, use it for consumption,
and then default. Ifthe creditors know this preference ranking and have
no way to constrain the manner in which the country uses a new loan,
the creditors would see clearly that the country would use any new
loan for consumption rather than for investment, and the creditors
would choose not to lend to the country. The market result would be
one of no lending and subsequent default.
Now, suppose that an outside institution can impose performance
terms on the debtor, forcing the debtor to use the loan for the purposes
of investment. In this case, both the debtor and the creditors will be
able to reach a better outcome, since the debtor will willingly submit
to the conditionality and end up with the loan, the new investment,
and the avoidance of default. This is a simple explanation of the role
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willingly tie their own hands in order to convince creditors that they
are indeed worthy of new loans.
Such an argument for the IMF and World Bank role in conditionality
supposes that the enforcement ofconditionality is a kind ofpublic good
that can only be carried out effectively by a centralized public insti-
tution and not by hundreds of independent and competing banks. It
also supposes that the IMF is effective in enforcing its conditionality
and, most important, that the conditionality terms provide a plausible
basis for raising debtor country welfare and for making it safe to lend
new money to the debtor country. These assumptions are of course
controversial, as I discuss in the next section.
4.5 The Mixed Success of the Debt Management Strategy
The strategy ofthe creditor governments has surely been successful
to date in keeping the foreign debts serviced. A good measure of this
success is the net resource transfer to the debtor countries, which
measures the net flow of new capital into the debtor countries minus
the repayment ofinterestand profits onforeign investment. Since 1982,
the net transfer has been negative, since the debtors have paid back in
interest much more than they have received in new loans. For Latin
America, the negative net resource transfer between 1982 and 1985
totaled more than $95 billion (see Sachs 1986, table 1).
Moreover, the long-term prospects for the debtor countries has
brightened with the recent decline in world interest rates, which will
tilt the balance to the benefit of the debtor countries in the future.
Indeed, export growth rates of the debtor countries might soon again
exceed nominal interest rates on debt, thus giving rise to a significant
restoration of confidence in the long-term debt-servicing capacity of
the debtorcountries and thereby easing the flow ofnew lending to these
countries.
On the otherhand, as mentioned in the introduction, the years under
the debt crisis and IMF-managed austerity programs have been ones
of extreme economic hardship and declining living standards in most
ofthe debtor countries. The prospects in the next couple ofyears also
appear bleak. In some of the worst cases, the declines are shocking,
with real output per capita down by over 20 percent since 1980. The
stunning declines in Latin American per capita output are shown in
table 4.7. Also worrisome is the fact that investment in the debtor
countries has declined sharply, so the underpinnings for renewed growth
in the corning years are not now being put in place. Table 4.8 shows
the large decline in national investment as a percent of GDP. Private
savings in the debtor countries is today spilling over into capital flight
rather than new domestic investments.259 Developing Country Debt



































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ~ ~The Economic
Crisis: Policies for Adjustment, Stabilization, and Growth," April 1986, Santiago, Chile.
Table 4.8 Ratios of Gross Investment to GOP, Debtor Nations, Various
Years, 1980-85 (percent)
Category 1980 1983 1984 1985
Countries with debt-
servicing problems 25.4 19.1 18.0 18.0
Countries without debt-
servicing problems 28.1 26.5 26.4 26.6
Western Hemisphere 23.4 17.4 17.2 17.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 19.9 17.7 16.5 17.2
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 1986, table A7, p. 186.
These declines in investment and output are intrinsic characteristics
of economies responding to a sharp cutoff in new lending, combined
with a sharp increase in interest servicing costs on existing debt. The
immediate result of the credit crisis was a remarkably sharp drop in
imports in the debtor countries. Import volumes in Latin America fell
by about 40 percent in the two years 1981 to 1983, as shown in table
4.2(c), producing a swing in the Latin American trade balance from a
deficit of$3.2 billion in 1981 to a surplus of$28.7 billion in 1983. Since
the improvement in the trade balance resulted from a cutoffofimports
rather than a rise in exports, the shock had a deeply contractionary
effect on the debtor economies.260 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
The question for policymakers is clearly posed by these facts. Is
there a better way to manage the crisis that would prevent a financial
collapse but at the same time encourage more growth? The answer
would seem to be yes. Several concrete suggestions for reform have
been broached, some of which are discussed in the following section.
Before those suggestions are discussed, however, I will outline some
of the main problems with the current strategy.
4.5.1 Problem 1: The Overemphasis on the Large Debtors
To a remarkable extent, the debt crisis has been managed with just
a few of the largest debtor countries in mind, specifically those few
countries that pose a real risk to the international banking system. The
commercial bank debt is remarkably concentrated. Mexico and Brazil
account for 40 percent ofall U.S. money-center bank exposure in the
Third World. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela account for 56
percent. None ofthe other troubled debtor countries has enough bank
debt to pose a serious risk by itself to the banking system. A detailed
breakdown of U.S. bank exposure in the developing countries shown
in table 4.9 clearly illustrates the high concentration of debt.
The current management of the debt crisis has been viewed as suc-
cessful to the extent that these four major debtors are sustained polit-
ically and economically and continue to pay their debts. But at the
sametime, many otherdebtorcountries are collapsing, and anadequate
strategy should handle these cases as well. Indeed, with more than
forty countries in crisis, it is inevitable that some extreme cases will
need special help. Yet to date all countries have been required to play
by the same rules as Brazil and Mexico.
A concrete example illustrates the problems ofthe current situation.
Because ofextreme political instability and economic mismanagement
under several military regimes, as well as the devastating external
shocks of the early 1980s, Bolivia fell into a deep debt crisis by 1982.
When international lending to Bolivia dried up in 1981, the net transfer
ofresources to Bolivia shiftedfrom large net inflow to large net outflow
as a percent of Bolivian GNP (see Sachs 1986 for details). Since the
foreign borrowing had been supporting government expenditures, the
loss in foreign funds created a fiscal crisis. A new, weak democracy,
which had come to power at the end of 1982, presided over this fiscal
crisis and ended up creating one of the worst hyperinflations of this
century. By mid-1985, the inflation rate had hit a 50,000 percent annual
rate.
During mid-1985 to mid-1986, even after a new democratic govern-
ment came to power committed to ending the hyperinflation, the IMF
never relented from its position that Bolivia must settle with the com-
mercial banks onnormal reschedulingterms. Fiercebattles werefought
between a desperate government and the IMF staff, with the IMF261 Developing Country Debt
Table 4.9 Exposure to U.S. Banks to the Debtor Countries, March 1986
9 Money-Center Banks All Other U.S. Banks
% of % of
%of Lending % of Lending





Venezuela) 42.7 97.5 56.5 23.4 36.2 59.5
Latin America 52.20 119.7 69.0 28.4 43.0 70.5
Africa 3.6 8.1 4.8 1.0 1.5 2.5
All LDCs 75.6 173.2 100.0 40.3 61.0 100.0
Individual Countries
in Debt Crisis:
Brazil 16.0 36.7 21.2 7.7 11.6 19.1
Mexico 13.8 31.2 18.3 10.4 15.7 25.8
Venezuela 6.9 15.8 9.1 3.4 5.1 8.4
Argentina 6.0 13.8 7.9 2.5 3.8 6.2
Chile 8.0 9.2 5.3 2.3 3.5 5.7
Philippines 3.6 8.2 4.8 1.4 2.1 3.5
Yugoslavia 1.3 3.0 1.7 0.7 1.1 1.7
Ecuador 1.2 2.8 1.6 0.8 1.2 2.0
Peru 0.8 1.8 1.1 0.6 0.9 1.5
Uruguay 0.7 1.6 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.5
Panama 0.7 1.6 0.9 0.3 0.4 0.7
Nigeria 0.6 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.5
Morocco 0.6 1.4 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.5
Ivory Coast 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2
Dominican 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.2
Republic
Costa Rica 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5
Jamaica 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.03 0.0 0.0
Romania 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.04 0.0 0.0
Zambia 0.08 0.2 0.1 0.00 0.0 0.0
Honduras 0.06 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.0 0.0
Malawi 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.0 0.0
Liberia 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.0 0.0
Senegal 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.0 0.0
Nicaragua 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.04 0.0 0.0
Sudan 0.03 0.1 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0
Zaire 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0
Source: Same as table 4.1.
insisting that it would support no program that did not include an
adequate amount of bank debt servicing. The IMF program was vital
to Bolivia's interests, both directly for the IMF loan and as a prelude
to the Paris Club and a normalization of relations with the outside
world. In the end, the government maintained a unilateral moratorium262 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
on bank debt servicing at whatever cost to its IMF program. The IMF
finally backed down from its threats to block the program, though it
continued to pressure the government to resume debt servicing.
The IMF advice to Bolivia in 1986, in the midst ofa hyperinflation,
is problematic. Bolivia was a clear case of a country crumbling under
the weight of foreign debt pressures. Safety valves, such as interna-
tionally sanctioned debt-servicing moratoria, should be provided in
such cases. Note that a cessation of interest on Bolivia's bank debt
probably involved an income loss of about $40 million per year to all
U.S. banks, or less than one-twentieth percent of U.S. bank capital.
4.5.2 Problem 2: The Overemphasis on the U.S. Money-
Center Banks
Just as four countries represent "the debtor nations" in the minds
ofmany policymakers, so too do nine U.S. banks represent the "world
financial system." The U.S. bank debt is concentrated not only among
countries but also among banks, with the money-center banks holding
the great bulk of the LDC claims. At the end of March 1986, for
example, the nine top U.S. banks held 65 percent of the LDC debt
held by all u.S. banks, although the money-center banks accounted
for only 40 percent of u.S. bank capital. The money-center bank ex-
posure in Latin America was 119.7 percent of capital, while for the
rest of U.S. banks the exposure was only 43 percent of bank capital.
Thus, the risks to the U.S. banking system from the debt crisis can be
isolated among a handful ofbanks, a fact that is often not appreciated
in thinking about the debt crisis.
Note that even for the heavily exposed U.S. money-center banks,
the risks of the debt crisis have diminished. Exposure in the LDCs
relative to capital has declined significantly. The 119.7 percentofcapital
exposure in Latin America, for example, is down from a level of 176.5
percent at the end of 1982. Thus, even the big U.S. banks have some
breathing room now, though the capital data probably overstate the
cushion for the big banks, since measured bank capital includes sub-
ordinated bank debt in addition to true equity capital.
In the United States, bank regulators have required write-downs of
loans in only the very worst cases, such as the Sudan, Bolivia, Peru,
North Korea, and Nicaragua. This treatment of course postpones a
realistic adjustment by the banks to cushion their positions, and it
seems to be much more generous to the banks (and shortsighted) than
comparable policies in other countries. The banks can report high
earnings and pay large dividends on the basis of their LDC exposure
even though future debt servicing is in question. The U.S. taxpayers
thereby bear much of LDC risk (via potential claims on the FDIC in
the event ofbank failures), while the banks continue to make dividend263 Developing Country Debt
payments. In other countries, the regulatory treatment of the debt
seems to be much more realistic. In Canada, for example, there have
been forced partial write-downs.for thirty-two developing countries.
In Europe, write-downs ofdebt are encouraged by a system ofhidden
reserves, which are givenfavorable tax treatment. By all reports, which
admittedly are difficult to verify in view of the lack of published Eu-
ropean data, the European banks have written off far more of their
LDC debts than have the U.S. banks and are therefore in a stronger
position to handle any new shocks or any program of debt relief.
The U.S. money-center banks have sought, and obtained, by far the
greatest influence of the international commercial banks in designing
banking policy vis-a.-vis the problem debtor countries. The policy in-
fluence is felt most directly in the bank steering committees that ne-
gotiate with the debtor countries. As shown in table 4.10, U.S. money-
centerbanks chairthe banknegotiating committees for allofthe largest
debtor countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the Phil-
ippines (Bank of Tokyo co-chair), and Venezuela (Lloyds Bank co-
chair), and the U.S. banks have a plurality ofvotes in the case ofevery
debtor country shown in the table except for Cuba, Madagascar, Mo-
rocco, Poland, and Romania. No doubt the European and Japanese
banks find the hard-line position ofthe U.S. banks a convenient one,
since it has produced years of complete debt servicing by the largest
debtors. But it should be recognized that the European banks could
readily accept a debt strategy that is more generous to the debtor
countries.
One ofthe ironies ofthe current situation is that while the U.S. banks
have vociferously opposed write-downs of LDC debt and all plans
involving debtforgiveness, the market value ofthese banks has already
declined in anticipation offuture debt write-offs. The stockmarket puts
a value on the commercial banks according to the values of the un-
derlying assets and liabilities ofthose banks. Not surprisingly, the mar-
ket appears to value the banks' claims on the problem debtor countries
at much less than the face value of those claims, as seen by a decline
in bank stock prices relative to the book values ofthe banks (see Kyle
and Sachs 1984). Evidence ofdepressed stock prices is fullX consistent
with the discounts on LDC debt that trade among the banks is a sec-
ondary market. Recent quotations (Salomon Brothers, December 1986)
on LDC debt show the following bid prices (per $100 offace value):
Argentina 66 Mexico 56
Bolivia 7 Peru 18
Brazil 75 Venezuela 74
Chile 67
Thus, in a sense, a market write-down of LDC claims has already
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this write-down (since it has not been matched by actual debt forgive-
ness), and the regulators have not forced the banks to bring reported
earnings and dividends into line with these more realistic asset values.
4.5.3 Problem 3: The Instability of New Private Lending
The bargain betweendebtors and creditors since 1982 has beenclear:
the debtor countries are to continue servicing the interest on theirbank
debts in return for a postponement ofprincipal repayments, easy terms
on official credits (both old and new), and new concerted lending from
the commercial banks. The third leg ofthis strategy has been shaky in
the past two years, despite the stated support for new lending from
the U.S. government in the context of the Baker Plan.
Three things have happened. First, for reasons described earlier, the
U.S. regional banks have been able to avoid their pro rata share ofnew
lending, as have many European and Japanese banks. The burden of
new debt servicing has (predictably) been left to those banks that are
already most deeply exposed, since the lesser exposed banks are able
to free ride. Second, the willingness ofthe large U.S. banks to engage
in concerted lending has also waned. As was shown in table 4.6, the
amounts ofmoney provided in concerted lending declined in 1985 and
1986 relative to the two previous years. In 1986, concerted lending
rebounded somewhat over 1985, but only because ofloans to a single
country, Mexico, and only after a bitter fight between the banks and
the U.S. Treasury (a battle not yet completely over at the time of
writing this paper). Third, while the concerted lending has provided
some new money to the public sectors of the debtor countries, the
private sectors have been net debt repayers, so that the banks are
reducing their total exposures in the debtor countries even while their
loans outstanding to the debtor country governments are rising.
The result is an enormous breach between rhetoric and reality. Dur-
ing the year since the Baker Plan was unveiled, banking exposure has
declined sharply. A recent report of the IMF contained the stunning
news that, in the first halfof1986, the developing countries repaid $7.1
billion (in addition to making interest payments!), in contrast to a net
borrowing of $9 billion in 1985, $15 billion in 1984, and $35 billion in
1983. (IMF Survey, December 15, 1986). Among the fifteen countries
singled out by Baker for special attention under the Baker Plan, bank
exposure fell by $3.4 billion. Data showing the decline in bank lending,
by region of LDC borrower, are shown in table 4.11.
The 1986 bank settlement with Mexico, which included $6 billion of
new financing for Mexico over an 18-month period, might be seen as
revitalizing the process of concerted lending, but it is just as likely to
cause a backlash against concerted lending, since many of the banks
deeply resented the pressures to lend more to a collapsing Mexican267 Developing Country Debt


































Source: IMF, International Capital Markets, December 1986, table 7, p. 46.
economy in which inflation was surging above 100 percent per year.
As evidencefor this resistance, countries such as thePhilippines, which
followed Mexico in the "queue" for bank rescheduling, hit a stone
wall at the banks, who were particularly fearful ofmaking the Mexican
program a precedent for other countries.
Overall, the current method ofinvoluntary lending is unsatisfactory
for two reasons. First, the amounts involved appear to be insufficient
to finance renewed growth in most of the debtor countries. Second,
the amounts are unstable year to year. Whenever an economy looks
like it can survive a year without new funds, the banks vociferously
resist new lending. The lending resumes only in the context of a re-
newed balance of payments crisis. This kind of on-again, off-again
lending greatly discourages investments in the debtor countries, since
investors recognize that the debtor country will be prone to balance
of payments crises for the foreseeable future.
4.5.4 Problem 4: Macroeconomic Oversimplifications
in Conditionality
Even under the best ofcircumstances, the return ofa debtorcountry
from the financial brink is difficult. Lenders and investors are wary of
an economy until a new and successful track record is established.
New industries must be developed to replace the declining sectors that
were previously fed by domestic demand or that have suffered from
the collapse ofinternational commodities prices. These difficulties usu-
ally require significant time and luck (a resource discovery, a terms of
trade improvement, a rise in foreign demand), and any progress can
come unhinged from domestic political unrest that follows in the wake
of economic austerity. Moreover, the growth of new sectors often re-
quires substantial public sectorinvestmentto providethe infrastructure
(e.g., roads, energy, irrigation, etc.) to make the new industries viable.268 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
One of the lesser recognized problems mentioned earlier is the fact
that the bulk ofthe external debt is heavily concentrated in the public
sector, so thatthefiscal situationin many debtorcountries has remained
devastated even after the country's trade balance has improved. Thus,
the debtor economies have remained the victims ofvery high interest
rates (when the government deficit is bondfinanced), very high inflation
(when money financed), or very inadequate public sector investments
(when expenditures are cut to make room for debt servicing), or a
combination ofall ofthese afflictions. Higher tax revenues in many of
thedebtorcountries will bea partofa realistic solutionto thecontinuing
fiscal crisis. Remarkably, however, the United States has recently op-
posed tax increases in the debtor countries as a matter of supply-side
principle, almost regardless ofthe realities in the countries themselves.
It is also true that, politically and economically, raising tax revenues
during a recession is very hard, especially since the contractionary
effects of a tax increase may intensify the recession.
The "official view" ofthe creditor community (with the United States,
the IMF, and the World Bank in the lead) has simplified the macro-
economic picture by arguing that drastic liberalization of trade and
domestic markets will solve the problem ofeconomic recovery. These
pronouncements ignore the problems just raised and are also ahistor-
ical. The great successes ofliberalization, such as in Japan or Korea,
have been affairs over the course of decades, not months. Rapid lib-
eralizations, as in the Southern Cone at the end of the 1970s, have
more often than not failed. Moreover, strong government intervention
in the Asian miracle economies ofJapan, Korea, and Taiwan appears
to have fostered, rather than hindered, economic growth.
4.5.5 Problem 5: Underemphasizing the Creditor
Country Responsibilities
The creditors have made much of the policy mistakes ofthe debtor
countries and have stressed that recovery from the debt crisis will
require a change of behavior in those countries. This emphasis has
some merit, we have seen, since most of the debtor countries made
serious policy mistakes in the past decade. But the focus is also seri-
ously misleading, since it reduces the much-needed scrutiny of the
behavior ofcreditor countries as well. As noted earlier, forty countries
did not simultaneously fall into crisis because of a virulent epidemic
of bad behavior; rather, the shocks of macroeconomic policies of the
creditor governments also played a key role. Similarly, the worsening
of the debtor situation since 1985 is not a result of debtor country
behaviorbutratherthecollapseofcommodities prices, which is a global
macroeconomic phenomenon.269 Developing Country Debt
The leading governments have only recently begun to coordinate
macroeconomic policies in ways conducive to recovery from the debt
crisis. The Reagan Administration spent its first five years denying any
responsibilityfor high world interestrates and renouncing any intention
of coordinating macroeconomic policies. That is beginning to change,
though the enormous U.S. fiscal deficit, which continues to hold world
interest rates atunusually high levels (to the debtorcountry detriment),
is only fitfully being brought under control.
Moreover, the United States and other creditor governments have
successfully divorced discussions about the debt strategy from discus-
sions about their own trade policies. It is an elementary proposition
that rising LDC exports are a key to a successful resolution ofthe debt
crisis, and yet with increasing frequency, trade actions by the United
States and the Europeans work directly against this imperative. As an
example, the United States recently (January 2, 1987) cut the benefits
under the generalized system ofpreferences for eight developing coun-
tries, including the debtor countries Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and
Yugoslavia. Similarly, voluntary restraints on steel exports into the
United States instituted in 1984 resulted in a restriction on steel exports
from many debtorcountries, mostimportantly Brazil and South Korea.
In general, with worldwide trade in agriculture, textiles, steel, and
increasingly electronics subject to extensive protectionism and con-
trols, it is extremely difficult and risky for a debtor country to embark
on an aggressive export push as a way to climb out ofa debt crisis.
4.5.6 Problem 6: The Failure of Diplomacy
The final problem that I shall raise is one of political style rather
than economic substance: the diplomatic manner in which the debtor
countries have been dealt with in recent years, and the role of these
countries in the formulation of their debt management strategies. My
point of reference is the Marshall Plan, which had as one ofits major
ambitions the development of political, as well as economic, stability
in Europe after World War II. One of the key aspects ofthe Marshall
Plan was that the European nations were required to work out a re-
covery plan on their own and then to submit that plan to the United
States for review and financing. Aftermuch debate, the Senate rejected
imposing strict conditionality in the program, arguing that it would not
be conducive to developing European support for and dedication to
their own recovery program. In fact, the only specific condition im-
posed in the program was the establishment ofa joint and continuous
European organization to oversee the recovery effort (Wexler 1983,
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In the case ofthe debt crisis, the developing countries have not been
treated with such dignity, but ratheras ifthey needed constant scolding
from superior developed country brothers. This has been an extremely
harmful aspect ofthe recovery process, with much time spent on fights
between the debtor countries and the IMF, which has rather autocrat-
ically attempted to impose its views on stabilization programs. The bad
will also spilled over into the Baker Plan, which dictates a radical free
market solution as the remedy for all ofthe debtorcountries' problems.
This attitude ofthe creditor countries is particularly hard to under-
stand in view of the fact that the debt crisis arose in most cases in
South America under autocratic military dictatorships that have since
been replaced by legitimate and responsible democratic governments.
Democracies have replaced military dictatorships in Argentina, B.olivia,
Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay, and in everyone of those cases,
the debt problem emerged under the previous military regime. In Asia,
the same can be said about the Philippines. In other words, the most
important step toward better government has already been taken.
4.6 Some New Steps in Managing the Debt Crisis
The earlier discussion in this paper suggests that the debt manage-
ment has leaned too far in the direction of protecting the commercial
banks and not far enough in promoting economic growth in the debtor
countries. Several innovations in debt management could be effective
in promoting debtor'country growth, seemingly without posting major
risks to the financial system. I will discuss three kinds ofinnovations,
many of which have been debated in policy circles in the past couple
ofyears. First, it has been suggested that there is a case for providing
partial debt relief for countries in the most extreme difficulties. The
present value of the country's obligations could be reduced through
one of a number of mechanisms mentioned later. Second, for most
other debtor countries, there may be a case for increasing and stabi-
lizing the inflows of new capital, particularly in view of the fact that
the concerted lending process seems to be functioning poorly. Third,
some ofthe risks now faced by debtor countries could be shifted onto
the international capital markets to allow the debtor governments a
greater ability to meet the uncertainties ofinterest rates, the terms of
trade, protectionism, and growth in the industrial countries.
These changes, which I will discuss at greater length in a moment,
could be combined with other changes responsive to the problems
identified in the previous section. Bank regulators might force a greater
capitalization of U.S. banks, and more write-offs, to cushion them
againstlosses onLDC debts in thefuture. Internationalmacroeconomic
coordination could focus on the trade and interest rate linkages needed271 Developing Country Debt
to overcome the crisis. Diplomacy could enhance, ratherthandiminish,
the stature of the new democracies of Latin America.
4.6.1 Partial and Selective Debt Relief
Twenty years ago, policymakers would have been much more en-
thusiastic about the case for selective debt forgiveness. In the gener-
ation after World War II, policymakers in the creditor governments
knew that the failure to grant timely relief on international debt had
severely weakened U.S. allies in the case ofinterallied war debts after
World War I; had contributed to the rise ofHitlerinthe case ofGerman
reparations; and had contributed to the attractiveness ofPeron's dem-
agoguery in Argentina in the 1940s and 1950s. These considerations
led the creditor governments to grant debt forgiveness to Indonesia as
recently as 1970.
Policymakers today fear debt relief because of its potential impact
on the commercial banks. However, reliefcould be granted selectively
and partially to a restricted group of debtor countries in a way that
would pose only minimal risks to the international financial system.
One proposal, suggested in Sachs (1986), would grant relief according
to a formula that gives reliefto the countries that have experienced the
largest declines in per capita income in recent years (other criteria
could be applied, such as granting relief only to the poorest countries,
orthose that have experiencedthe greatestterms oftrade shocks, etc.).
In order to minimize moral hazard problems, it is recommended that
the relief be granted only as part ofan internationally supervised pro-
gram of stabilization and reform.
In the specific illustration in Sachs (1986), relief is given in the form
offive years ofcomplete forgiveness ofinterest payments from debtor
countries that have suffered a drop in per capita GDP of 15 percent or
more since 1980. In Latin America, this criterion includes most ofthe
debtor countries, but importantly excludes Brazil and Mexico, whose
GDP decline has been less severe. The suspension is to apply to all
debts currently subject to rescheduling by the commercial banks and
by the official creditors in the Paris Club. It turns out that the overall
relief provided by U.S. banks to five major Latin debtor countries
(Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela) would total $6.6 billion
in present value, and by all BIS banks, $19.1 billion. The forgiveness
by U.S. banks would represent approximately 6.2 percent of bank
capital. This 6.2 percent of bank capital is much less than the market
write-downs of bank stocks that have already occurred!
How could relief by the banks actually be effectuated? One way
would be through moral suasion of the creditor governments and the
IMF, or even through legislation. A different and interesting way, sug-
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ofa financial institution (eitheran existing institution, such as the World
Bank, or a new one created for this purpose). In the Kenen-Hatori
plan, the international entity would issue a bond that is guaranteed by
participating creditor governments and swap the bond with the com-
mercial banks for their LDC claims. The new guaranteed bonds would
have an interest rate somewhat below the market rate, and that lower
rate would be passed along to the debtor countries. As in the previous
example, the reduction in interest rates could be tied to the extent of
deterioration of the debtor economy.
This plan has two key desirable features. First, the banks would be
relinquishing a risky income stream with a positive spread over LIBOR
for a safe asset with a negative spread. The improvement in the quality
ofthe banks' portfolios would be enough tojustify such a swap to bank
shareholders, who might otherwise object to a straightforward write-
down of debt. Shareholder objections would be moot, since it is clear
that the market is already heavily discounting the value ofLDC assets
in the secondary market. Second, the plan would offer debt reliefwith
no direct costto the creditorgovernments (ortheirtaxpayers). Itwould
be self-financing, in the sense that the commercial bank shareholders
would effectively be supplying the relief.
4.6.2 Increasing Net Capital Flows to the Debtor Countries
Many countries do not need explicit relief. Rather, they require in-
creased and steadierinflows ofpublic and private capital. The question
here is how to generate the increased and steadier inflows in view of
the fact that the commercial banks are reducing, ratherthan increasing,
theirexposures. Mostproposalsfor vastamounts ofnewofficial lending
are nonstarters, particularly in this period of budget austerity in the
major industrial countries. There will have to be a continued reliance
on private market lending to provide the needed capital, and the key
to such lending is to make new private lending safer, in one way or
another, than the existing stock ofdebt. There are several ways to do
this. One common suggestion is for more cofinancing of projects be-
tween the World Bank and the private sector, thereby allowing the
private lenders to piggyback on the seniority of World Bank loans
(which by convention are never rescheduled). A related method would
be to strengthen the insurance system for international investments
(such as the MIGA).
A different way that leads to the same outcome, but without the
need for any new official money, is proposed in Sachs (1986). In the
proposal, an explicit agreement among the existing creditors would
allow the debtor country to borrow a predetermined level ofnew funds
that would be earmarked as senior to the existing debt. In other words,
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in entirety before any ofthe existing debt is serviced. The new lenders
under this arrangement would not have to be banks. Senior lending
could be made on the'basis ofmarketable securities purchased by asset
funds, corporations, or private wealthholders. As with the relief pro-
posal, eligibility for seniority borrowing should be limited to countries
with poor economic performance, but not so poor as to trigger debt
relief. For example, eligibility might be given to countries that have
suffered a decline in per capita GDP during the 1980s.
The multilateral institutions would have several functions in this
proposal. First, the IMF would reach an agreement with the country
on the amounts of incremental lending that will be raised on a senior
basis. Unlimited new borrowing would not be allowed. Rather, the
amount of senior debt would be linked to growth targets in the debtor
country and the quality of investment opportunities. The IMF would
record and monitor the new senior borrowing and help to verify the
seniortreatmentofthe new debt. The World Bankand the MDBs would
continue to play their existing roles of defining and monitoring the
investment programs ofthe country to support the effective utilization
of the new borrowing.
The proposed arrangement would have the virtue that new capital
could be provided to the debtor countries without having to make a
judgment about the eventual fate of the existing debt. If the debtor
country resumes its growth, both old and new debts will be serviced.
If growth does not resume, the old debts will be written off, which
presumably would have happened anyway under the current system
of concerted lending. The proposal has both pluses and minuses for
the existing creditors. By agreeing to such a program, the banks could
suffer a reduction in value oftheir existing claims, but at the same time
they would be freed from the obligation ofinvoluntary lending, which
now puts the burden for new lending precisely on those banks whose
portfolios are already filled with the' largest exposure in the debtor
country. Additionally, the value of the existing debt would be raised
by this plan, notlowered, to the extentthatthe newborrowingenhances
the debt-servicing capacity of the country by more than the interest
cost of the new loans.
The amounts ofnew senior borrowing might represent 6 or7 percent
of the existing stock of debt each year for the next few years. This
level would eliminate the net resource transfers currently made by the
debtor countries to the creditors. At this rate, for example, Mexico
would accumulate approximately $35 billion of new senior debt over
the next five years, an amount that could readily be raised by new
market borrowing, since $35 billion of debt could be easily serviced
by Mexico in the future, as long as that $35 billion is serviced before
any of the existing $100 billion of Mexican debt.274 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
4.6.3 Shifting Risks to the International Capital Markets
So far, the international capital markets have done little to diversify
the profound economic risks facing the debtor countries. Loan agree-
ments have few contingencies, for example, linking the level ofrepay-
ments to the state ofthe borrowing economy, its terms oftrade, or any
otherindicators ofthe borrowing country's economic well-being. Com-
modity-linked bonds have never gotten offthe ground for reasons that
are not well understood by financial specialists. Interest rate risk is
borne entirely by the borrower, since almost all debt is in the form of
variable interest securities. The borrowers also face the risks ofcredit
cutoffs, with little possibility ofobtaining creditcommitmentsforfuture
bo~rowing.
It would seem that many of the risks facing the debtor countries
could be more efficiently diversified through more complex loan agree-
ments. An initial example is the Mexican accord reached in 1986, which
contained two important innovations. First, there was a link of new
financing (and ofIMF performance criteria) to the price of oil: a drop
in the price of oil raised the level of funds to be made available to
Mexico, and a rise did the reverse. In either direction, the change in
funding is gradually phasedoutoverseveralquarters, so thateventually
Mexico has to adjust to, and not simply finance, the changes in its
terms of trade. The second special facility is a growth contingency
loan, which allows Mexico to draw on more official and private funding
for increased government spending if for any reason its growth does
not meet the program targets during a fixed period. Given the com-
plexity ofthe determinants ofgrowth in the short term, negotiators felt
that it was impossible to write an even more elaborate contract which
linked the "growth" lending to changes in underlying conditions, even
though the agreed terms suffer from the moral hazard problem that
self-inflicted growth slowdowns are also rewarded by new lending.
There are several additional proposals that have been made in recent
years of a similar nature. Interest rate capping was widely discussed
in 1984 before being dropped, butit remains a promising way for shield-
ing the debtorcpuntries from some market risks. The debt-equity swap
mechanism is also partly a way to shed risks (and also partly a hidden
mechanism for partial debt forgiveness) by making the creditor take
an equity position in the debtor economy. Finally, the mechanism of
linking debt-servicing payments to the level ofexports, as unilaterally
adopted by Peru in its ceiling ofdebt servicing to 10 percentofexports,
or to GNP (as proposed by Feldstein 1986) is yet another way for
shedding some of the risks of debt servicing. Brazil, in a more con-
sensual manner, is adopting the Peruvian position in its current debt
negotiations by seeking to limit net resource transfers to its creditors
to 2.5 percent ofGNP. Such a rule would automatically alter the amounts275 Developing Country Debt
of debt servicing according to market interest rates and according to
GNP growth in Brazil.
4.7 Conclusions
The management of the LDC debt crisis since 1982 has been an
important example of successful international policy coordination. At
the time of the outbreak of the Mexican debt crisis in the summer of
1982, many observers feared that the crisis would provoke an inter-
national banking crisis and a global depression. Those fears have not
come to pass in large part because of the active involvement of poli-
cymakers from the creditor countries, the debtor countries, and the
multilateral financial institutions.
The origins of the debt crisis can be found both in the shift in the
global macroeconomic environment in the early 1980s and in major
policy mistakes in many debtor countries. From a macroeconomic
perspective, the fundamental change in the global economy was the
rise in interest rates to levels exceeding the growth rate ofexports of
the debtor countries. Once this rise in interest rates occurred, the debt-
export ratios ofthe debtor countries could be stabilized only by a shift
to trade balance surpluses, a shift which required deep and often painful
macroeconomic adjustments. Moreover, since most ofthe foreign bor-
rowing had been undertaken by the public sectors ofthe debtor coun-
tries, the shift in interest rates also required sharp budget cuts in the
public sector. For most debtor countries, the long-term debt-servicing
prospects are not bleak, and it is realistic to expect over the long term
that needed adjustments to the trade balance and the budgets can be
made in most countries. The recent declines in global interest rates
greatly enhance the long-term prospects for a successful resolution of
the crisis. Nonetheless, short-term difficulties could still easily derail
a successful resolution of the crisis.
Policymakers recognized three distinct roles for public intervention
in managing the debt crisis. First, public authorities recognized that
the marketplace itself could not provide adequate enforcement of the
existing debt contracts. A complete hands-off attitude of the public
authorities would likely have resulted in widespread defaults by the
debtor governments with adverse consequences for all parties con-
cerned. Second, the policymakers recognized that if left by itself, the
loan market would likely provide insufficient levels ofnew funding for
the debtor countries. There is an inherent gap betvJeen the self-interest
ofindividual banks, who want to pull out willy-nilly from new lending,
and the collective interest of all creditors, who are best served by
continuing to make new loans to the problem debtor countries. Third,
the policymakers recognized that there is a role for the IMF to impose
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in cases where misguided policies contributed to the onset ofthe debt
crisis.
The public role was conceived with these problems in mind. Led by
the U.S. government, the creditor governments coalesced around a
strategy that included: (1) pressure on the debtor countries to maintain
debt servicing; (2) pressure on the commercial banks to continue lend-
ing in "involuntary" lending packages; and (3) IMF conditionality as
the cornerstone ofnew lending agreements. To a significant extent, this
package has forestalled widespread defaults and has prevented the
worst fears of 1982 from coming to pass.
There continue to be serious problems, however, with the imple-
mentationofthis strategy. First, the pressure to maintain debt-servicing
payments has been carriedtoa pointofabsurdity, so thatevencountries
in the midst of 50,000 percent hyperinflations, or free falls of income,
have been pressed to maintain debt servicing. Second, the pressure on
commercial banks to continue lending has waxed and waned. Invol-
untary lending has proved to be too little and too unstable a financial
basis for economic recovery in most of the debtor countries. Third,
the contents ofconditionality have been oversimplified, with the IMF
and the World Bank pressing for immediate liberalization as the key
to recovery in the debtor countries, contrary to logic and historical
experience. This has led to a backlash from the debtor countries that
strongly resists such simple and politically dangerous prescriptions.
Several recommendations were discussed in this paper as possible
remedies to these shortcomings. The recommendations revolved around
three areas: partial debt relief; stabilized capital inflows; and a shifting
ofrisks now borne by the debtor countries to the international capital
markets. It was suggested that partial debt relief would not have to
pose profound risks for the international system, and that such relief
could be targeted to the countries most in need. With respect to new
capitalinflows, a proposalfor new seniorlendingto the debtorcountries
was broached, with the aim of stabilizing and increasing the size of
capital inflows into the debtor countries. Finally, various proposals
were discussed that aim at shifting risks from the debtor countries to
the international financial markets, such as interest rate capping and
commodity-linked lending.
Notes
1. Detailed accounts of the crisis can be found in several recent books,
including Cline (1984), Lever and Huhne (1986), Lomax (1986), Makin (1984),
and Nunnenkamp (1986).277 Developing Country Debt
2. See Sachs (1982), Eichengreen and Portes (1986), and Fishlow (1985) for
descriptions of the ups and downs of international lending during the past
century.
3. The top ten debtor countries in 1983 ranked by gross external debt to BIS
banks were Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Korea, Venezuela, Philippines, Yu-
goslavia, Indonesia, Egypt, and Chile, ofwhich Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia,
and Egypt are oil exporters, and Argentina is approximately self-sufficient. Oil
exports exceed oil imports for this group of countries as a whole.
4. A country that borrows the money it needs to make its debt service
payments will have its debt grow at the rate ofinterest (e.g., with interest rates
at 10 percent, a country that borrows its debt-servicing bill will see its total
debt grow by 10 percent per year). As long as that interest rate is equal to or
less than the growth rate ofexport earnings, then the debt-export ratio will be
stable or falling.
5. See M. P. Dooley, "Country-Specific Risk Premiums, Capital Flight and
Net Investment Income Payments in Selected Developing Countries," IMF
Research Department, DM/86/17, March 1986.
6. For a breakdown ofthe debt by creditorfor different groups ofborrowers,
see IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 1986, table A48, pp. 244-46.
7. See IMF, International Capital Markets, December 1986, pp. 74-81.
8. The analytical oversimplifications tend to come in several places, as men-
tioned later in the text. First, in order to service the country's debts, GNP
must be in an acceptable form-specifically, in the form of export earnings.
However, as economies shift from domestic production to exports, measured
GNP may well decline in the short run to intermediate run. Second, since the
debts are generally owed by the public sectors ofthe debtor countries, debtor
governments must raise taxes or cut spending in order to service the debts.
Such fiscal actions will tend to exacerbate many macroeconomic problems,
such as unemployment and recession. Third, private investors are likely to
shun economies suffering from debt crises, thus undermining the economic
growth that is counted on to facilitate future debt servicing.
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2. Anthony M. Solomon
Prospects for the LDC Debt Problem
A couple of weeks ago I was in San Francisco when Marty Feldstein
and his European and Japanese colleagues in a study group presented279 Developing Country Debt
a very big paper on the debt question. I was struck by the careful
analytic way in which they took all this myriad of debt management
proposals, that we've been hearing for four and a half years, and ca-
tegorized them, broke them down into three basic categories, and then
did some evaluation ofthem.
I'm not going to do any of that today, because basically I think it's
almost irrelevant to the process of dynamic action that is going on
among the players. I believe that the banks-the creditor banks-are
incapable of taking a concerted initiative to choose and push forward
an alternative debt strategy. There arejusttoo many differences among
them-small banks versus large banks; European banks, Japanese
banks, and American banks who have different regulatory, different
supervisory, different accounting, and different tax policies. And even
among the U.S. money-center banks there are some differences.
What I am going to try to do today is give you my feeling for what
the new factors are and how this situation is likely to play out as a
matter ofreality. And believe me I have a lot ofquestion marks in my
mind because I have a cloudy crystal ball too.
But this is the way I like to approach it, because I just think it's too
complicated to expect anything but the day-to-day evolving situation
and the interplay among all these different players to determine the
final outcome. Some people will say that, even though the banks may
be incapable of a concerted initiative, you can have a forcing action
by sovereign debtor governments, who will simply declare moratoria.
But I find myselfvery, very confused in this area. Look at the actual
situation. Peru declared in effect a moratorium on commercial bank
debt service, medium term and long term. Many of the bankers said
they were going to get tough with Peru. Peru was small enough; their
exposure to Peru was small enough to get tough and therefore teach a
lesson. I have yet to see any retaliation against Peru by the banks.
Please don't misunderstand me. I'm not making any kind ofjudg-
ments that they should or should not be retaliating. I'm trying to talk
about the facts ofthis situation.
Mexico went for continuation ofthe existing conventional strategy,
although in its Baker Plan form there is more emphasis on growth.
Brazil has declared a moratorium, but I hear increasing talk that the
Brazilian industrialists are bringing enormous pressure on the Brazilian
president to dump his finance minister, to call off the moratorium, to
make some conciliatory gestures, and to begin negotiating, because the
industrialists are afraid that the financing for imports and exports will
seriously hurt their businesses.
This is notwithstanding the freeze in short-term credits that the Bra-
zilian government announced. I'm sure that Bill Ogden can enlighten
us in greater detail, but I assume the reason why the freeze doesn't
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expire, that money returns to the Brazilian government if its frozen,
and they have no confidence in the Brazilian government that it will
make those funds available again to the Brazilian industrialists. I don't
know if that's correct or not, but I assume that's why the freeze is not
calming the fears of the Brazilian industrialists.
Argentina is talking about settling, ifit can get Mexican terms. Now
can you imagine that two-eighths of a point difference above LIBOR
is going to make this kind ofdifference between confrontation and no
confrontation? I find myself very confused by this, because so far the
facts are that there has been no retaliation. There are certain countries
that could probably continue a substantial part of their foreign trade
(although in a much more inconvenient form) without the credit ex-
tended by the banks, but they are still reluctant to go down that road.
I also hear reports that what the Brazilians are really afraid of is a
trade boycott by the U.S. government if they were to default. Again,
I find that hard to believe. Ifthey were to formally repudiate the debt,
possibly. But that's not likely. They're not going to do it that way.
They'll simply have a moratorium and, while they're negotiating, not
pay interest for debt service, and this will drag on and on. But I cannot
see the U.S. Congress imposing a trade boycott on Brazil. In fact, on
the contrary, any consensus that may exist is to promote more U.S.
exports to Latin America, and certainly a trade boycott on imports
would not lead in that direction.
So I find myself thoroughly confused by the play and the players. I
don't see that there is any clear trend yet whereby the sovereign gov-
ernments are going to force moratoria. ButI'llcome backto this toward
the close of my remarks.
I think there have been some changing factors in the last year or two
that are important enough to comment on. One is that there is a much
greaterintellectual consensus and concernfor growth in the LDCs than
there was before. I think there is very little sympathy for what are
called, I think erroneously so, IMF austerity programs. There is very
little sympathy for LDCs being pressured to pay full interest by com-
pressing their imports in order to have a large enough trade surplus.
This is important because it changed the tone ofthe debate; it changed
the bargaining power ofthe different players.
Anotherfactor that is important, I think, is that there has been much
more erosionofthe ability ofbanks to get togetherto putup money. The
smaller banks are falling by the wayside more and more, and the big
banks are getting very desperate about this problem. Also, as more and
more big banks write offor write down part oftheir loans (it's not en-
tirely a rational action), it makes them more resistant than ever to put-
ting up theirshare ofnew money. So you have a lotoffatigue,an erosion
developing on the side ofthe banks' willingness to put up new money.281 Developing Country Debt
Another factor of course is that there is fatigue on the part of the
LDC debtor countries willingness to do these austerity-type programs.
There is this intellectual consensus on growth that's been made re-
spectable by the Baker Plan, and all the talk goes in that direction.
So it seems pretty clear that the priorities are going to be such that
any d~bt strategy has to be consistent with more adequate growth for
the LDCs. This leaves everybody in confusion. What is really being
looked atby the key players? I thinkit'sfair to say, as I seethe situation,
that a lot of attention is on developing an exit vehicle for the smaller
banks. There's not only a Reserve Bankers' Committee, but there are
also certain high echelons in the World Bank that are studying this.
It's not obviously a World Bank proposal by any means, and it would
take the consentofcreditorgovernments who are powerful in the Bank.
But the proposal goes along the lines of a partial guarantee to a sov-
ereign debtor government putting out a ten-to-fifteen-year bond issue,
the money to be used to buy debt paper from the smaller banks, or up
to a certain amountfrom all the banks, at the discount in the secondary
market. That would have a double advantage. First, it would reduce
the debt service ofthe debtor countries, because now when the paper
is sold in the secondary market, that's no help to the debtor country.
And second, of course, it would help clean up this problem of elimi-
nating the nuisance ofthe small banks' refusal to put up their share of
the new money.
There are different forms in which this can be done, and there's been
talk-not in the World Bank, but outside the World Bank-by bankers
about setting up another institution, a subsidiary to the World Bank
which would be an intermediary in buying up debt paper at the sec-
ondary market discount. This is less practical politically.
Parenthetically, I'm not so sure that under any ofthese arrangements
the small banks will rush to sell their paper at the discount of the
secondary market. I can see the discount of the secondary market
shrinking the minute they see anything really being done in this area.
It'san enormouslycomplicatedproblem. The trouble with all ofthese
debt proposals is that they sound nice sometimes, but they are incre-
dibly complicated to implement in a way that would achieve the results
intended.
I think it is worth saying that what we are seeing is that the public-
sector component ofthese support packages for the debt-ridden LDCs
is creeping up. In the Mexican package, the public sector has gotten
up to 50 percent when you include the World Bank, the IMF, the official
export credits, et cetera.
Now even ifthis exit vehicle instrument is devised, where does that
leave us? Stepping back and looking at the whole picture ... even if
this proposal is successfully implemented . . . where does it leave us?282 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
It seems to me it doesn't really affect the bottom line that much,
even though it would be a help. The bottom line is still going to be
that, in my opinion, without adequate economic growth in the indus-
trialized countries, I see no way for the heavily indebted LDC countries
to begin to get the adequate growth that there is now a consensus they
must have. How else can they develop the resource flow they must
have to get that growth while also, incidentally, although an important
factor of course, methodically servicing their debt in an orderly and
conventional way?
I think that all these debt strategy proposals basically boil down to
ways of alleviating or mitigating the situation somewhat and buying
time for the banks. There's talk now among the banks aboutdeveloping
what's called a menu of options, whereby each bank can choose the
particular form of support that it wants to give. That's easier said,
again, than put into practice. To develop equivalencies of sacrifice or
of support or of whatever you want to call it is very, very difficult.
The most obvious one support option has been talked about for many
years: the capitalization ofinterest to an amount equivalent to the new
money that other banks are putting up. In practice, capitalization is
difficult because the banks fear that ifthe debtor governments see that
40 percent of the interest can be capitalized and stretched out, then
they might unilaterally push for 60 percent or 80 percent or ultimately
100 percent.
So I feel that the problems are enormous without adequate OECD
growth. That brings us back to the discussion this morning aboutpolicy
coordination, and I won't go into that.
What happens if we don't have adequate growth and sufficient re-
source flow? I think that's by far the most likely scenario over the next
couple of years. What's going to happen in the debt situation?
It seems to me, even ifthe Brazil moratorium gets cleared up, that
we will see a recurrence ofmore random moratoria from time to time,
and some of these will then get patched up in new agreements after a
whjle. For example, I cannot see the next president ofMexico coming
in and calmly continuing the conventional strategy that has been fol-
lowed. I think both the political and economic situationin Mexico make
that almost impossible. We will see confrontations from time to time.
I doubt that the banks will be able to come up with a concerted bank
compromise strategy package that could be successfully negotiated
with the sovereign debtor governments. I think that there will be in-
dividual deals struck and many deals not struck. There will be con-
fusion. I would assume that at some point the situation will force
governments, particularly the U.S. government, to take the initiative
and try to hammer out some compromise packages. That will probably
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full bailout for the banks. It seems to me that the difficulty we will be
getting into as the situation becomes more confused will be one where
the U.S. government ultimately will have no alternative. Overthe years
as this process goes on, the banks will build significant reserves (or
write-downs) against their exposure. My guess is that the history books
will finally say that the larger partofthe sovereign country commercial
bank debt was neverrepaid (nordid they return to good-credit standing
with the commercial banks), but the process of absorbing some sub-
stantial partofthis debtas loss was successfullyandgradually stretched
out by all the parties.
3. William S. Ogden
The Need for Change in Managing LDC Debt
This August will mark the fifth anniversary of Finance Minister Silva-
Herzog's visit to New York and Washington to inform governments
and banks that Mexico could not service its external debt. His an-
nouncement, and the subsequent realization that many other countries
were in similar circumstances, led to anabrupt halt in commercial bank
lending to developing countries. At the peak of this truly worldwide
crisis, over forty countries were affected.
I gave a talk on this subject in the fall of 1982 in New York. At that
time, many observers perceived the causes ofthe crisis, and research
has helped us understand them better today. I identified four principal
players in the debt crisis: debtor countries, creditor country govern-
ments, multinational institutions, and commercial banks. Each shared
responsibility for the onset of the problem and each currently has a
critical role to play in its resolution. Within this context, I would like
to comment briefly upon the policies pursued over the last five years,
and then turn to the future.
Let me begin my saying that, with hindsight, it is easy enough to be
critical of the initial responses of these players. We should remind
ourselves, however, that in spite oftheir mistakes, the response to date
has been largely successful. In this regard, I have special praise for
Jacques De la Rosier and the role he played throughout this period.
While designing an active role for the IMF, he managed to remind
others that the IMF was actually filling a gap left by its member
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These players helped us avoid the threat to the economic system the
debt crisis posed. Indeed, over the last five years some countries have
seen major improvements. Many countries now enjoy access to inter-
national financial markets that they either did not have five years ago,
orwere in real dangeroflosing in 1982. The global economy has grown.
World trade did not continue to decline. Protectionism, or at least
protectionsim with a vengeance, has been held at bay. Even the banks
are stronger, as their capital has grown and their income stream has
become more diversified. Let us, therefore, not lose sight of our
achievements as we examine the need for change in the process. Let
us also remember that in 1982 we rejected many of the more radical
solutions so easily set forth by others. Let us also continue to look
with great skepticism on proposals for easy solutions which claim to
make the problem go away.
Having said this, the need for change in the process has become
increasingly apparent. It is more than a liquidity crisis arising from a
sudden loss ofconfidence in almost all debtor countries. True enough,
in some countries such as Korea, Columbia, and Thailand, it was an
issue of confidence and they have regained market access. We have
even forgotten now that Korea was affected in those early months of
the crisis. But for a number of LDCs, the problem turned out to be
more intractable, truly a debt problem. Unfortunately, some of the
countries with the very largest external indebtedness fall into this group.
For example, the five largest Latin American debtor countries have
seen their foreign debt grow steadily, from $276 billion at the end of
1982, to $319 billion at the end oflast year. As a result, the debt burden
of this group, relative to its economic size, has remained substantially
unchanged.
There were three events over the last year which represented both
a greater recognition of the need for change in the process, and the
beginning of a new chapter. The Baker initiative was one of them. It
recognized the long-term nature ofthe problem. It also acknowledged
the political impossibility and economic undesirability ofstrategies that
are perceived as calling only for further sacrifice and slow growth well
beyond the time horizon ofa few years. Such policies are unpalatable
in any context, but particularly in countries with rapid population growth
and in those struggling to legitimate new democratic institutions. A
third, but to my mind no less important, element ofthe Baker initiative
was its explicit recognition that some countries are so deeply mired in
underdevelopment, poverty, precious misallocation of resources, and
social ills, thattheirproblems cannotbe solved through the coordinated
efforts ofthe four principal players. Instead, these countries must work
directly with creditor governments and multinational institutions.
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policy response with much in the way of specificity behind it. Nor did
it provide leadership behind which the major players could rally, or
even debate. Charitably, it was more than a speech, but not a policy.
The second event signalling a clear need for change occurred in the
efforts this year to provide refinancing for Mexico. Concerns arose
about the way it was done. Concerns over the system ofallocating fair
shares among the participants and the unwillingness ofsmaller creditor
banks to participate at all. The coyness with which governments of
major creditor countries attempted to position themselves in their dual
role as both regulators and interested parties, and the different treat-
ment of banks within each of the creditor countries was not helpful.
All in all a host of frustrations made it extremely difficult to put the
financing together.
Some of the difficulties, as Tony Solomon has already pointed out,
just represented weariness on the part ofthe players. The fatigue was
compounded by the slowness ofmulitnational institutions to formulate
a program that was consistent with the spirit of the Baker initiative.
Even more fundamentally, there were doubts that Mexico, even with
the best of intentions, could carry out its end of the program.
The third and complete turning of the page that made it clear the
strategies ofthe last five years had finally become unworkable was the
confrontational negotiating tactic adopted by Brazil in theirmost recent
rescheduling. Such a strategy might be explained and evenjustified by
some, while it would be condemned by many others. But, regardless
of one's position, such behavior signals the close of the chapter on
debt which began in 1982, and crystallizes the need for change. In my
opinion, however, the need for change does not mean radical change
or radical solutions. As weary as we are, and as desirous as we are to
make the problem go away, instant gratification for all four players is
just not feasible. It is also not desirable in terms of future access to
international financial markets, orgrowth in the debtorcountries, world
trade and the world economy.
Now, I would like to turn to the kind of changes that I believe are
necessary. First and foremost, it seems to me that we must stop dealing
with debtor countries as though they are a homogenous group. Each
country is unique, with a unique setoffinancial and development prob-
lems. Each should be encouraged to work out its own programs, rec-
ognizing both that growth must be a priority and that creditor conces-
sions made to particularly troubled countries cannot automatically
become the common denominator to be applied in all cases. For ex-
ample, it is just as ridiculous to say to the Bolivians that they should
look to Argentina for proof that the process is working rather than at
their own suffocating economy, as it is to insist that concessions made
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as a high Brazilian official pointed out to me recently, it certainly was
not lost on finance ministers in debtor countries that a finance minister
in Mexico was replaced ostensibly for not being tough enough on the
banks.
A second element of needed change lies in that sore subject ofcon-
ditionality. No country likes conditionality applied to it. Years ago I
saw a number of countries in Europe take offense at the idea of con-
ditionality being applied to them. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that
cooperative efforts tied to highly questionable economic programs and
short-sighted political windfalls not only cannot be part of such a pro-
cess, but are self-destructive. Such efforts not only fail, their failure
undermines the viability of cooperative solutions.
While it might sound naive, my own experience leads me to believe
that if we can agree on a vision for growth with some mutual sacrifice
and resistance to protectionism, a responsible conditionality, tailored
to each individual country, could be achieved. To reach such an un-
derstanding, the creditor and debtor country governments would have
to take the lead. They will need, however, to negotiate a lot less coyly
than they have in the past. Put simply, we need leadership. Condition-
ality is too important a subject to be left to the IMF and other multi-
national institutions without strong political leadership from the major
creditor countries.
The third areain which change is badly needed is in achieving growth
in trade and income. Naturally, I referto thefrequently mentioned need
for resistance to further protectionism in the creditor countries and for
economic growth in the debtor countries. But I also believe that eco-
nomic growth in the creditor countries and resistance to protectionism
in the debtorcountries areequally important. As far as creditor-country
growth is concerned, I refer most particularly to creditor countries
other than the United States. From 1982 to 1985, all ofthe net increase
in Latin American exports to the industrial countries was accounted
for by the United States. Over that time the share of that troubled
region's exports bound for the U.S. rose from 33 to 41 percent. By
contrast, Japan's imports from LatinAmericaremainedunchanged and
Germany's registered only a modest gain.
Continued protectionism practiced by the debtor countries should
also be questioned. This issue should be raised particularly with the
emerging industrial countries that never lost market access. In general,
creditor countries ought not condone highly discriminatory practices
by debtor governments, regardless ofwhether or not the debtors have
access to international financial markets or are members ofthe GATT.
I would like to putforward three other elements ofchange thatfocus
on the role ofthe commercial banks. First, we must expectthatadverse
shocks to debtor countries, such as a precipitous drop in export prices287 Developing Country Debt
oran earthquake, will require additional financing. I recognize that this
goes against traditional precepts in that it implies increased lending
when circumstances worsen. But there is both a precedent and a need
for this. I think, however, that creditor governments should playa
bigger role in reacting to the vagaries ofexternal forces, both in terms
of the financial commitments they are willing to make and in terms of
their willingness to exert leadership roles.
Second, I believe that the private sector can playa more helpful role
in developing both debt-for-equity swaps and the so-called secondary
market for sovereign debt. These market-related responses are not a
panaceaand cannotsolve the whole problem. They canbeanimportant
element, however, not only by helping to share and transform the risk,
but by signalling that debtors prefer investment to debt. This signal
becomes particularly clear when combined with sensible economic
policies that encourage investment in the first place. In addition, such
policies make possible the return of flight capital, which has made
external financing much more difficult in many of the countries. It is
appalling that some debtor countries have such tight restrictions on
debt-for-equity swaps and yet complain of their inability to service
foreign debt and of their need for growth.
Third, it is sometimes said that banks have not yet taken any losses
in sovereign risk-lending. The truth is that many have, and that all will
over time. This does not imply, however, that the debt should be for-
given, nor that any rote formula should be applied across the board.
Debt-for-equity swaps, for example, may lead to greater risk and fre-
quently will involve write-down of the debt swapped.
As far as the secondary market for sovereign debt is concerned, it
is developing. I think this is a healthy sign, and I can see considerable
growth for it in the future. Nevertheless, it is important to remember
that these secondary market transactions cannot by themselves solve
either the problem of the current debt "overhang" or the problem of
future lending. I also think that the accounting profession ought to stop
quibbling over whether this so-called market establishes a price for
debt instruments of a particular country. In additon, I think finance
ministers in the debtor countries should not use the secondary market
discount as a vehicle for clubbing the banks by arguing that, since the
market has already written offa percentage ofthis debt, only a smaller
amount needs to be serviced.
Next, let me come to two even thornier issues, as far as the banks
are concerned. The first has to do with the negotiating process, which
by its very nature requires that leadership be provided by a committee
representing all bank creditors. This is a problem specific to the Amer-
ican banks, simply because there are so many ofus involved. I believe
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committees to creditor banks in other countries, where there are fewer
syndicated banks and where confidentiality is more easily maintained.
Frankly, there is also more confidence that the interests of all of the
banks in countries other than the United States are being represented.
It is not for lack oftrying, and to be completely fair, also not for a lack
ofgood will. This communication issue among the American banks is,
nevertheless, a very nettlesome one. I applaud the efforts among the
American banks, or at least some ofthem, to address this problem. It
is critically important as we go forward.
The second issue that applies to all banks, but particularly to the
American banks by virtue of the sheer number involved, is that some
banks have a considerably smaller commitment to international bank-
ing. They not only wish the problem would go away, but have lost any
willingness to participate. This is very understandable, particularly if
a bank never had any genuine interest in international business, got
into it in a burst ofenthusiasmin the 1970s, and now has gotten burned.
Such banks have little knowledge of how negotiations are proceeding
and learn more from newspapers than they hear from the negotiating
banks. They are constantly trying to explain their involvement to their
boards of directors who share the view that the bank should never
have gotten into the international business in the first place. Combine
that with opportunities for profitable domestic business and with reg-
ulators who must already carry water on both shoulders, but view it
as essential to continue reinforcing bank directors' responsibilities in
the management oftheir banks, and you have an enormous amount of
pressure to drop out of refinancing. We must find a solution to this
problem. There have been many proposals made, ranging from the idea
that no bank should be allowed to drop out to the idea that if a bank
drops out it cannot have a free ride on everyone else. The central issue
is, of course, who will make up the difference if some are permitted
to drop out.
A further complication is that a number ofbanks have sold or swapped
loans to other parties. In these instances, the problem of defining the
size ofa fair share becomes even more complicated. The purchaser of
debt in the secondary market, or the holder of equity from a swap
often does not intend to put up any new money for additional debt
accumulation. As a result, in some cases a bank that has sold or swapped
the debt of a particular country has been asked to put up a share of
new money based on what it held formerly. This has already become
a problem. As the market for loan sales and swaps increases, it will
become an even bigger problem.
I think we have to find a way to address the issue of the smaller
banks, especially those smaller American banks that want out. Tony
Solomon has already alluded to some of the proposals that are being
discussed. I would suggest we begin to develop a mechanism to en-289 Developing Country Debt
courage their participation rather than continue to ignore the dropout
problem. One such approach might be a government program to guar-
antee partially the first x-million dollars or its equivalent ofdeveloping
countrydebt held by eachofthe commercial banks. Becausethis would
be an absolute amount, invariant to the amount ofa bank's capital or
the size of a bank's portfolio, it would represent a much larger per-
centageofthe total amount held by any ofthe smallerbanks. To qualify,
the bank would have to set aside reserves of, say, a third of the guar-
anteed amount, or a fourth of the program amount. The same per-
centage would apply to any new funds that would have to be provided
in the future. This scheme would recognize that, in voluntarily ac-
cepting the guarantee, a bank would also have to be willing to establish
such a reserve. This would mean a reduction in defined primary capital
by that amount, but would not be a write-off ofthe debt.
As an illustration, let me give you a sense of how this might have
worked in the recent Mexican financing. If we assume that the gov-
ernment through some mechanism would provide a 75 percent guar-
antee for the first $25 million from each bank, we estimated that ap-
proximately 50 of the 101 U.S. banks that had committed by the end
of March would have been fully covered by such a program. These
banks, however, would be required to participate in future refinancing
and would have to write down the 25 percent of the debt not insured.
The U.S. government would therefore be guaranteeing about $1.3 bil-
lion of debt if all 101 U.S. banks chose to participate. For their part,
the banks would have to increase reserves by about $435 million. These
calculations exclude about50 American banks which did not participate
in the 1984 rescheduling negotiations. In other words, last time a third
dropped out.
I would alsolike to suggestthatthe commercialbanks, theaccounting
profession, and the Securities and Exchange Commission begin to ex-
plore a possible change in accounting conventions. One positive change
would permit banks to set up allocated reserves of narrowly defined
exposure in such a way that the charges could flow directly to their
capital accounts, rather than through their income statements and then
into their capital accounts. Before we all throw up our hands at this
heresy, let me say that there are ample precedents in the way that we
have treated some ofthe problems ofthe savings and loan industry, in
the way that the country debt restructurings have not automatically
meant loans were reclassified as nonperforming, and in the way that
all corporations have beenpermittedto take exchange rate fluctuations,
under certain carefully defined rules, directly to their capital accounts,
rather than through their income statements.
It was not that long ago when every chiefexecutive officer ofa major
multinational corporation in America was explaining how his earnings
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I would guess that a lot ofchief executive officers are not even aware
how this affected their capital accounts in this last quarter. I have not
been asked by a bank-stock analyst in years about the impact of ex-
change rate fluctuations on our capital accounts, whereas I used to be
quizzed regularly on the income statement.
I know there are problems with suggesting that loan write-offs be
passed through to capital. But I think the idea should be explored, as
it would allow increased flexibility and make it easier to take a longer
view. This emphasis on quarter-to-quarter performance is a criticism
of American corporate management we have all heard. Perhaps it is
true, butit is partly a result ofthe unnecessary emphasis in ourfinancial
markets on short-term earnings.
In summary, the developing country negotiations seem to be well
into a new stage. It seems likely, however, that current negotiations
will require even more coordination than the substantial amount that
has been seen in the last five years. I think a change in the process is
urgently needed.
Butit is also becoming increasingly apparentthat the majorplayers-
the debtor countries, creditor-country governments, multinational in-
stitutions, and commercial banks-will have to begin to play signifi-
cantly different roles, and that the political leadership has to comefrom
government.
4. Eduardo Wiesner
Latin America's Policy Response to the
Debt Crisis: Learning from Adversity
It is notable that many advances in economic analysis have arisen
from efforts to understand and cope with adversity. (Stanley W. Black,
1985)
I am most grateful to Dr. Martin Feldstein for having honored me with
his invitation to participate in this Conference on International Co-
operation. As we enter into the fifth year of dealing with the debt
problem, this confe~nce offers an excellent opportunity to take stock
ofwhat has been achieved and to reflect on the issues that still remain
unsettled. More generally, this is a good occasion, I think, to look at
Latin America's broad policy response to the debt crisis. I deeply
believe that an examination of that response is the best way to deter-
mine the long-term significance ofthe debt crisis. What really matters291 Developing Country Debt
is policies. So one must look at events and developments but always
in terms of their relationship with policy change. I have organized my
presentation in four parts. First, I will provide a brief background on
the origins of the debt crisis. Second, I will review developments in
the period 1983-86 and comment on what appears to be the major
policy accomplishments of the region to date. Third, I will examine
the current situation and the pending issues at this juncture. Finally, I
will try to outline the directions that Latin America's policy response
may take in the years ahead.
At the outset, let me underline that for reasons ofbrevity I will have
to summarize and simplify very complex matters.
Origins of Latin America's Debt Crisis
The debt crisis was the combined result ofthree sets ofinterdepen-
dent causes: (a) inadequate economic policies followed by a large num-
ber of countries; (b) imprudent lending policies on the part of the
commercial banks; and (c) adverse global economic conditions at the
time.
On theirpart, the debtorcountriesincurredlargefiscal deficits 1which
led to growing current account deficits and to excessive external in-
debtedness. The high absorption ofexternal resources was not accom-
panied by a corresponding increase in investment but by increased
consumption and by lower ratios of domestic savings. In brief, the
accumulation of external liabilities was not accompanied by a signifi-
cant increase in assets within the debtor country. In these circum-
stances a debt crisis became a question of time, which proved to be
very short as external disturbances arose in 1982.
On the part ofthe creditors, there were imprudent lending policies,
particularly by the large international commercial banks which offered
ample and easy credit especially to the public sectors ofthe borrowing
countries. They engagedinwhatHirschman(1987) has called "vigorous
loan pushing." These loans were made on the-mistaken-assumption
that sovereign lending involved little if any risk.
Global international economic conditions changed abruptly in the
early 1980s when real interest rates rose from about 0.6 percent in 1979
to more than 7 percent in 1982. An aggravating factor at the time was
the deterioration ofthe terms oftrade for most ofthe Latin American
countries. Finally, when in 1982 the world economy, and with it world
trade, entered into a severe recession, the debt crisis erupted.
In brief, the debt crisis came about because there was overborrowing
and overlending. Without the imprudent policies of lenders and bor-
rowers it is not certain that the adverse world economic conditions
would have created, by themselves'~alone, a debt crisis.2 These dis-
turbances simply precipitated the crisis; they did not create it. The
debt crisis came because both lenders and borrowers made mistakes.292 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
One can then conclude that they both share the responsibility for the
debt crisis.
Ofcourse, one cannot assign proportions to this responsibility. Per-
haps an implicit distribution canbefound in the choices thatwere made
at the outbreakofthe crisis. The banks hadto choose between (a) large
and immediate losses ifthey were to turn their backs on their debtors,
or (b) to provide some additional new money to protect their existing
claims. The debtor countries had to choose between (a) abrupt and
probably inefficient adjustment, if they were to declare formal mora-
toria; or (b) to make a serious effort to service their obligations in
exchange for a relatively less onerous adjustment. As we know, both
the banks and the countries chose negotiation overconfrontation. They
both saw a net gain in such a strategy.
Developments and Accomplishments, 1983-86
The strategy that was put into place in late 1982 and early 1983
worked well. Indebted countries adopted strong adjustment programs,
commercial banks provided new money, and both official and multi-
lateral creditors also substantially increased their disbursements. The
results were prompt and positive. Between 1982 and 1984, Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, and othercountries more than halved theirnonfinancial
public-sector deficit in relation to GDP. This strengthening ofthe fiscal
position contributed to a very substantial improvement in the current
account of the balance of payments ofthe region. For Latin America
as a whole, the current account deficit was reduced from an average
of $43 billion a year in 1981-82 to less than $3 billion a year in 1984.3
Although this adjustment was achieved mainly through a sharp reduc-
tion in imports, it is worth noting that import volumes did increase in
1984 and 1985.
Thepolicy corrections adoptedby thedebtorcountries, besidesbeing
supported by additional concerted money from the banks, were helped
by a more auspicious world economic climate in 1983 and 1984. During
those years, growth resumedin the industrial countries and real interest
rates declined. These factors contributed to a return ofgrowth in Latin
America, and the region as a whole grew by 3.2 percent in 1984 and
by 3.7 percent in 1985 (see table 4.12).
The gains in adjustment made in 1983 and 1984 were not sustained
in their entirety in 1985. Several factors contributed to that situation.
There were slippages in economic policies in the debtor countries and
inflation accelerated. Also, growth in the industrialized countries re-
turned to a more moderate level of 3 percent. Lastly, oil prices began
to come down at the end of 1985. These factors, together with the
virtual cessation ofcommercial banklending, resulted in renewed pres-
sures on Latin American countries.293 Developing Country Debt
Table 4.12 Real GDP Growth in Selected Latin American Countries, 1981-86
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Argentina -6.8 -4.6 2.8 2.6 -4.5 5.7
Brazil -3.4 0.9 -2.5 5.7 8.3 8.2
Chile 5.5 -14.1 -0.7 6.4 2.4 5.7
Colombia 2.3 0.9 1.6 3.4 2.4 5.0
Ecuador 3.9 1.2 -2.8 4.0 3.8 1.7
Mexico 7.9 -0.5 -5.3 3.7 2.8 -3.8
Venezuela -0.3 0.7 -5.6 -1.3 0.3 3.0
Source: International Monetary Fund.
The policy response was uneven. In some instances a frontal attack
on inflation was launched, which was the case of Argentina with its
Austral plan (June 14,1985) and ofBoliviawith its stabilization program
(August 1985). In the case ofBrazil, while the external sectorremained
strong, inflation accelerated to 235 percent in the twelve months ended
in December 1985. Finally, in early 1986, the authorities adopted the
Cruzado plan as a comprehensive monetary reform to eliminate infla-
tion. In the case ofMexico policy, slippages led to higher inflation and
to a real effective appreciation ofthe peso through the first halfof1985.
Nevertheless, it can be said that, on the whole, the region continued
to show relatively good performance in the external sector. ChIle made
considerable progress in reducing its current account deficit, and Ven-
ezuela, in spite ofthe drop in oil prices, maintained a' current account
surplus and reduced its overall public sector deficit.
This generally positive policy response contrasted sharply with the
reluctance of the commercial banks to continue to bear their share of
the costs. Although it was desirable for the banks to lower their ex-
posure from the unsustainable rates of 1980 and 1981, the extent to
which theirlendingcontractedafter 1984 createda very serious problem
(table 4.13). Also, it was not clear how such a policy could have been
in the best interests of the banks themselves.
With this setting, at the Annual Meetings of the International Mon-
etary Fund and the World Bank in Seoul, Korea, in late 1985, the V.S.
Secretary ofthe Treasury announced what became known as the Baker
initiative. His proposal was aimed at revitalizing the debt strategy. It
rightly stressed the three basic ingredients of the debt strategy: (a) a
strengthening of policies on the part of the debtor countries; (b) ad-
ditional financing from commercial banks; and (c) a greater technical
and financial role by official creditors and by the multilateral institutions.
A key contribution ofthe Baker proposal was the emphasis it placed
on the need for internal structural adjustment as a condition for sus-
tainable growth. Vnderlying this initiative is the realization that a country294 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
Table 4.13 Total Cross-Border Lending to Western Hemisphere Countries (in















Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Bankfor International Settlements, data
reported to the Fund on currency distribution of banks' external accounts; and Fund
staff estimates.
aAs measured by differences in the outstanding liabilities ofborrowing countries, defined
as cross-border interbank accounts by residence of borrowing banks plus cross-border
bank credits to nonbanks by residence of borrower. Adjusted for changes attributed to
exchange rate movements.
can register a large degree of external adjustment and still maintain
large internal imbalances (Wiesner 1986). In fact, we have seen that
many LatinAmericancountries were able to improve substantiallytheir
trade and current account positions but were unable to really suppress
inflation or to restore growth on a permanent basis.
This emphasis on structural change is correct, especially ifit is seen
as the way to reconcile the constraints imposed by the other two pos-
sible alternatives to pursue growth. Since these countries already have
a heavy debt burden, they must minimize their external borrowings,
and since they cannot run the risk of higher inflation-or more depre-
ciation-if they were to adopt expansionary fiscal and monetary poli-
cies to foster growth, they must look for the additional resources they
need in higher productivity and efficiency in the use of the existing
stock of capita1.4 This is the essence of structural change: extracting
additional resources from a more efficient resource use of existing
assets. It does not involve more indebtedness or the risk of higher
inflation or exchange rate depreciation.
I would like now to turn to the central theme ofthis paper, namely,
the policy response of Latin America to the debt crisis. In particular,
I will refer to the policy response in the area of external adjustment.
External Adjustment in Latin America
The long-term significance ofLatin America's debt crisis will depend
on the effect itwill have on the quality ofthe economic policies ofthe
region. If no basic improvement in policies were to emerge, then the
crisis would have been very costly indeed; but if some basic policy
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ofeconomic management, then the debt crisis would not have been in
vain and it could even prove to have had beneficial effects in the long
term. Although it is still too soon to reach a final judgment on this
matter, I believe it can already be said that in the process ofadjustment
one very basic lesson has been learned: Countries should not let their
exchange rates become overvalued. This is what Fischer (1987, 32) has
called "the most important commandment" of economic policy.
Before the debt crisis, Latin American countries had tended to allow
their exchange rates to become overvalued and in some cases kept
them in parity with the U.S. dollar in the face of rapidly declining
international reserves and high rates of domestic inflation. As Cud-
dington (1986, 24) has pointed out, the consequences of this policy
were capital flight, exchange rate instability, and stagnation ofnontra-
ditional exports. Well, it would seem that this is no longer the general
case. It now appears as ifLatinAmerica's policymakers are determined
not to be caught up again in a situation in which they do not have a
minimum of international reserves to protect their trade and to meet
their external obligations (table 4.14). Most policymakers seem com-
mitted not to let the history of 1982-83 repeat itself.
The results ofthis change are encouraging in terms ofthe growth on
nontraditional exports. In the case of Mexico, nonpetroleum exports
rose by close to 40 percent during 1986; agricultural exports in partic-
ular grew by almost 60 percent to $2.1 billion. In the case of Chile,
noncopper exports have been growing at close to 10 percent a year
since 1984. Nontraditional exports in Ecuador grew by 25 percent on
average in 1985 and 1986, mostly on the strength ofincreased produc-
Table 4.14 Real Effective Exchange Rate Changes in Selected Latin American
Countries, 1980-86 (percentage change)
Dec. '86 Dec. '86 Dec. '86
---
Country Dec. '80 Dec. '84 Sept. '85
Argentina -60.2 -6.1 15.7
Brazil -14.4 -9.9 -2.5
Mexico -48.2 -39.3 -30.8
Chile -47.3 -25.3 -9.7
Colombia -35.4 -37.4 -23.3
Costa Rica -39.8 -20.8 -17.3
Ecuador -34.9 -22.1 -24.3
Guatemala -23.5 -28.9 5.1
Uruguay -31.8 -2.3 1.6
Venezuela -49.2 -44.7 -39.0
Source: IMF Information Notice System.
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tion in agricultural, shrimp, and fish products. In general terms, one
can see substantial gains in exports ofnontraditional products in Col-
ombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and others.
Behind these developments there is a remarkable degree of real ef-
fective exchange rate depreciation. From 1980 to 1986, Argentina has
depreciated its currency by a little more than 60 percent, Venezuela,
Mexico, and Chile by close to 50 percent, and Colombia by 35 percent.
In some cases, such as Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela,
there has been a very large real effective depreciation in the last two
years. The particular situation ofMexico deserves to be underlined as
the authorities have courageously maintained a realistic exchange rate
policy even when there were calls to slow the pace ofdepreciation to,
allegedly, moderate an already high rate ofinflation. By following this
policy, Mexico has been able to avoid a major crisis, even in the face
of the sharp drop of the price of oil and the absence of the external
financing expected from the commercial banks.
This more realistic and flexible exchange rate policy does not mean,
ofcourse, that the major problems ofadjustment have been solved in
Latin America. After all, current account deficits (tables 4.15 and 4.16)
are still high, and it couldbe argued thatthe countries arejustvalidating
in the exchange rate the still high rates ofdomestic inflation (Fishlow
1986, 6). This may be true. Depreciating a currency in line with do-
mestic inflation, or even with a differential with the rest ofthe world,
does little to correct the internal imbalances that give rise to that in-
flation. It could also be argued that, underthe so-called "real exchange
rule, the authorities no longer control the price level and that inflation
might become unstable" (Adams and Gros 1986,439). This may be so
but not in all cases. Ifthe move toward a more realistic exchange rate
does not result in a gain of international reserves, there is no reason
to expect that the authorities will necessarily lose control oftheir do-
mestic credit policy. But, even beyond this, my point is that it is better
Table 4.15 BOP Current Account Surplus or Deficit (-) in Selected Latin
American Countries, 1980-86 (as a percentage of GDP)
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Argentina -8.5 -8.3 -4.1 -4.0 -3.7 - 1.5 -3.5
Brazill -5.0 -4.3 -5.8 -3.3 - 1.2
Chile -7.1 -14.5 -9.5 5.4 -10.7 -8.2 -6.5
Colombia 0.4 -6.1 -10.1 -9.8 -6.8 -3.9 1.6
Ecuador -7.0 -10.0 -11.5 -1.2 -2.4 1.1 -6.3
Mexico -5.8 -6.7 -3.3 3.7 2.2 0.4 -1.0
Venezuela 4.1 3.2 -4.8 5.7 9.4 5.9 -4.9
Source: International Monetary Fund.297 Developing Country Debt
Table 4.16 Current Account Surplus or Deficit (-) in Selected Latin
American Countries, 1981-86 (in billions of U.S. dollars)
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Argentina -4.8 -4.7 -2.4 -2.5 -2.4 -1.0 -2.6
Brazil -12.8 -11.7 -16.3 -6.8 -0.2 -3.0
Chile -2.0 -4.7 -2.3 -1.1 -2.1 -1.3 -1.1
Colombia 0.1 -1.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.1 -1.2 0.5
Ecuador -0.6 -1.0 -1.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.6
Mexico -10.7 -16.1 -6.2 5.3 3.8 0.7 -1.3
Venezuela 2.4 2.1 -3.2 3.3 5.0 2.9 -2.3
to adjust the nominal exchange rate when there is domestic inflation
than to try to maintain an overvalued domestic currency.
Now, some authors argue that what really matters is external ad-
justmentand balanceofpayments viability, andthatas long as a country
is able to meet its external obligations one should not be overly con-
cerned about domestic inflation. But the question then arises about the
fragility or precariousness of the external adjustment if internal im-
balances are left uncorrected. And we have seen some examples of
this.
Although one must be careful in drawing conclusions from changes
in exchange rates, and there are many caveats that should be kept in
mind,5 I think it can be reasonably argued that what the numbers show
is that policymakers in Latin America have learned a lot about the
significance ofthis key price in their economies. Maybe more will need
to be done to really set these countries on a long-term export growth
strategy, but in any case what they have done so far is encouraging.
Current Situation and Pending Issues
Currently two major issues are pending in Latin America. The first
one has to do with the difficulties ofa number ofcountries to achieve
more internal adjustment in terms ofgreater success in controling in-
flation and laying the basis for durable growth. The second one has to
do with external financing, particularly the role to be played by the
commercial banks which seem to have become increasingly reluctant
to continue to provide financing.
The first issue is basic. In essence, it is the old question of how to
eradicate high rates of inflation without having to go through a reces-
sion.6 The two major monetary reforms adopted by Argentina and
Brazil, the Austral and the Cruzado plans, ran into serious difficulties
after some initial success. These two experiences suggest that transi-
tional income policies and direct price interventions cannot substitute
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involve a balanced government budget and a sustainable position of
the current account balance of payments. Some authors argue that in
the long run notonly a balancedbudgetis requiredbutalso''areduction
in the size ofthe public sector" is necessary (Blejer and Liviatan 1987,
20).
Let me now move on to the related topic of structural adjustment,
which in its mostconcise definition refers tothe strengtheningofgrowth
through a more efficient use of existing resources. The basic question
about structural change is not whether it is needed but how to imple-
ment it. We know the theory and we know the objectives, but that is
not enough. We know that most public sectors should not continue to
grow in relative terms, and yet fiscal deficits often are reduced not by
cuttingexpenditures butbyincreasingtaxes. We know thatexpenditure
cuts should not take place in the investment budgets, and yet that
happens with disturbing frequency. We know that trade liberalization
will generally make economies more efficient, and yet we see that
countries are reluctant to open up their economies. We know that
overregulation is deleterious to growth, and yet governments end up
unable to rid themselves of such restraints.
Why is the implementation of structural change so difficult? A large
part ofthe answer lies in what Helen Hughes (1985, 19) calls "political
obstacles" and in that power of vested interests.? The answer in my
personal view lies in the strong political powerofthose who gain from
large, inefficient, interventionist public sectors. There are strong po-
litical reasons that make it very difficult for policymakers to cut public
spending, layoff workers, or lower barriers to imports. I place a lot
ofemphasis on the deliberate aspect ofthis type ofmeasure to highlight
the contrast between internal structural adjustment measures, on the
one hand, and external adjustment policies, on the other.
In the first case, the policymakers cannot resort to the political pro-
tection offered by the argument that their policies are dictated by ex-
ogenous factors such as the fact that they have run out of foreign
exchange. Here, policymakers are more vulnerable to political obsta-
cles as they seem to be adopting policies that are their own creation
and arising from convictions about some abstract theoretical model.8
Ultimately, policymakers do choose implicitly or explicitly the level of
domestic inflation that they have, while in the area of external adjust-
mentcountries cannotreally choose betweenadjusting ornotadjusting.
In other words, internal adjustment is to some extent avoidable or at
least postponable, while external adjustment is inevitable.
This argument takes me directly to the Baker initiative and its em-
phasis on structural adjustment. Is there not a contradiction here? I
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change, and now I say thatit is extremely difficult, for political reasons,
for countries to implement comprehensive structural adjustment mea-
sures. I do not believe that is a contradiction. What I want to do is to
add a word ofcaution about how much can reasonably be expected in
the area of domestic structural change. It is important to avoid high
expectations of quick results in the correction of internal imbalances
through policy-based lending to remedy supply-side rigidities. Care
must be taken to avoid the possibility ofincurring a mistake similar to
the one made in the years preceding the crisis, when bank commercial
lending seemed a risk-free source of financing. The risk now is that
some countries may give the appearance of adopting major structural
adjustment measures in exchange for policy-based financing, when in
fact they can deliver relatively little in this area in the short run.
Does this meanthatpolicy-basedlendingfor the correctionofinternal
imbalances should not be increased by multilateral institutions and by
official governments? Certainly not. But it should be done with full
awareness that its conditionality will be more difficult to implement
and to monitor than more traditional external adjustment performance
criteria. What we must try to avoid is that, say, in 1990 and onwards
we discover that the countries have become heavily indebted to, say,
the World Bank and the IDB, but that commensurate progress has still
not been achieved in structural areas.
The second unresolved issue at this juncture is the role expected of
the commercial banks. The Chairman ofCiticorp has stated that" cap-
ital will notbe providedin any significant amounts unless the conditions
of the financial markets are met" (Reed 1987, 27). On the other hand,
the indebted countries argue that without additional financing they
cannot service their obligations and maintain a modicum of growth
(Funaro 1986, 4). Behindthese positions is the issue ofhowtodistribute
the gap between the contractual value ofthe debt and the lower market
value of those claims. For the commercial banks it is difficult to lend
more money when the market discount is telling them that the new
debt "will immediatelyfall to the same discount as the existing debt"
(Dooley 1986, 3). For the debtors it is very difficult to service the
obligations at theirfull contractual value when some ofthe correspond-
ing assets are not performing for them either, at least not performing
for their public sectors. Since the market has already established a
discount, some believe that full service at the contractual value WQuid
mean a windfall profit to the banks.
Since all possible strategies9 to manage the debt problem must in-
volve some additional financing, this market discount is seen by many
as a potential source of financing. The discount would provide debt
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losses which the markets already have registered. All that is needed,
some argue, is a mechanism or an institution to purchase the debt at
the discounted market price.
On the surface this proposal looks appealing, but things are more
complicated than that. In reality, there are no simple solutions to the
debt problem (Mulford 1987), and there are a number ofquestions that
need to be answered. First, from a distributional point of view, the
question is: Who should gain the most from such debt relief, the coun-
tries that have the largest discount orthe ones with thelowestdiscount?
Is there not a "moral hazard" problem here? Granting more relief to
those who have adjusted less may induce others to loosentheirpolicies.
A second question, from an efficiency point ofview, is: Will this form
of debt relief impair future international capital flows? Last and very
important: Could debt relief be provided outside a policy framework
of adjustment and structural change?
To this lastquestion, the mostrealistic answeris thatcountries should
continue to adjust and to improve the quality oftheir economic policies
in spite ofthe tensions that exist in the system, including uncertainty
about how this issue of debt relief will be settled. It would seem that
countries have no better alternative than to continue their efforts to
reduce their imbalances. After all, this is the only thing that they can
really control. Ifthe international economic environment were to turn
inauspicious to the efforts ofthe indebted countries, even if the flows
of external finance were to shrink, those countries that adopted the
bettereconomic policies would still be the ones able to avoid the most
onerous forms ofadjustment and would be the ones with better pros-
pects for long-term growth.
If what the debtor countries want is more independence from the
commercial banks orfrom external uncertainties that are beyond their
control, such as changes in international real rates of interest or de-
clining terms of trade or increasing protectionism, the best response
lies in prudent economic policies. In spite of all the limitations and
restrictions, this is what ultimately remains in their hands to a larger
degree than anything else.
Possible Evolution of Latin America's Policy Response
Although it is difficult to say in which direction Latin America's
policy response will evolve in the future, it may be interesting to look
at some possible future policies somewhat apart from any particular
solution ofthe debt problem. The idea is to focus on avenues ofpolicy
response that seem highly probable under most circumstances.
One area where policy response is not very difficult to visualize is
that dealing with domestic savings. It would appear that debtor coun-
tries have little choice but to increase their domestic savings as the301 Developing Country Debt
magnitudes of external savings that will be available to them will not
grow very much over the next few years. This will not be an easy
policy tofollow, butitseems one thatcanhardly beavoided as countries
will find that they must finance with a larger proportion of their own
resources the investment necessary to achieve higher rates ofgrowth
over the medium term.
Since it would be difficult to finance large fiscal deficits without
exacerbating inflationary pressures or without crowding out an already
weakened private sector, it can be expected that, on the whole, the
current fiscal effort to strengthen public finances will be maintained.
While smaller fiscal deficits will contribute to a strengthening of do-
mestic savings, it is not certain that this will also mean a reduction in
the relative size of public sectors. That is, countries may be more
inclined to reduce fiscal deficits by increasing revenues rather than by
reducing expenditures. However, efforts can be expected to be made
to increase the efficiency ofpublic sectors, particularly oflarge public
enterprises; how effective those efforts will be is very difficult to say.
Under most possible outcomes ofthe present problems faced in the
debt strategy, it can be assumed that most Latin American countries
will continue to pursue efforts to strengthen their external sectors.
Policymakers are likely to continue to seek more competitiveness
through their exchange rate policies and will seek to avoid overval-
uations of their exchange rates. They will certainly work hard to
strengthen their international reserve positions. Whether this will also
mean a more liberal trade policy is not clear. This is a very sensitive
political area. Itcould beassumed that with more depreciated exchange
rates in real effective terms most countries would be more receptive
to trade liberalization. And yet it may well be that policymakers will
remain cautious on this front, as they seem concerned about the dif-
ficulty of managing a liberalization scheme at the same time they are
trying to implement a stabilization program.
In terms of the sequence of liberalization, I have no doubt that the
capital account will hardly be liberalized. The experience with capital
flows has been rather negative in Latin America (Edwards 1984, 91),
and there is also the question of whose risk would the possible new
debt turn out to be. The debt crisis has sent Latin American policy-
makers the message that it is dangerous to open up the capital account.
The experience of the last five years indicates that, at the end of the
road, private risks tend to become public risks (Wiesner 1985). This is
one area where many years will have to go by before liberal policy-
makers will be able to persuade public opinion about the alleged ad-
vantages of freely flowing capital resources. Those countries who in
good faith followed that policy now find their public sectors and their
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Given the recent experience with the emergence of the debt crisis,
where external disturbances turned out to be so important, it can be
expected that policymakers in Latin America will pay more attention
to the international conditions in which they conduct their own poli-
cymaking. In other words, economic policymaking in Latin America
will tend to improve as the authorities realize that they must look
through the global interdependencies10 to arrive at forecasts on, for
instance, international interest rates or protectionist trends. Although
these may be processes overwhich they have little control, orprecisely
because they do not control them, they will have to incorporate some
assumptions about their possible behavior in their own policymaking
exercises. This will be a salutary consequence of the debt crisis.
In brief, an overview ofthe possible policy responses ofLatin Amer-
ica over the next years suggests that there will be, in global terms, an
improvement in the quality of the economic policies. There will still
be many flaws and setbacks but, on the whole, there will be more
discipline in thepublicfinances, betterexchange ratepolicies, and some
gradual advancement in structural change, but not much. This will be
a positive balance. Although history is full offorgotten lessons, I be-
lieve that some of the ones learned from the debt crisis will long be
remembered by Latin America.
Concluding Observations
Looking back on the past four years, the debt strategy that was put
in place was effective in achieving its immediate objectives. Major
individual country and systemic crises were averted and, most notably,
a framework was established to coordinate the efforts ofdebtor coun-
tries, official and bank creditors, and international institutions. Never-
theless, it cannot be said that normal relations between debtors and
creditors have been reestablished.
The policy response of Latin America to the debt crisis has been
more effective in dealing with external imbalances than in controling
domestic inflation or in laying the foundation for economic growth on
a sustainable basis. It is a common experience that the reduction of
external imbalances precedes that ofreducing internal imbalances, per-
haps because the former is viewed as inevitable and beyond the control
of the authorities. Internal adjustment-namely, reducing inflation or
the size of public sectors or making them more efficient-requires
measures and policies that often are vigorously resisted politically, in
partbecause they are notnecessarily perceived as actions thatare truly
indispensable.
Structural change is certainly the long-term correct strategy to es-
tablish the conditions for durable growth, particularly when countries
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incurring substantial additional external indebtedness. Although struc-
tural change is the right approach, it must be recognized that there will
be strong political resistance to measures aimed at reducing the relative
size of the public sectors or at opening trade or the capital accounts
of the balance of payments.
The present debt strategy is under strain because one ofits important
components, namely additional commercial bank financing, has be-
come increasingly difficult to obtain; it is noteworthy that in 1986 com-
mercial bank flows to Latin America were negative (see table 4.13).
Compounding this situation is the weakening of the adjustment effort
in some of the debtor countries. In these circumstances, calls have
been made again for some form of debt relief. The discount that the
markets have established between the contractual value of the debt
and its price in the secondary market is seen by some as the way both
to provide debt relief and to allow the banks to present their situation
in more realistic terms. However, there are difficult distributional and
efficiency issues that need to be settled first. Beyond that there is also
the key question ofwhere the financing is going to come from for any
instituti.on to buy country debt, even at a discount.
Finally, it should be said that achieving economic growth on a sus-
tainable basis is a very elusive and complex goal. Durable economic
growth does not come about without a major effort of savings, in-
vestment, and technological and educational changes within a society.
Sustainable growth does not follow automatically from the mere avail-
ability ofadditional financing, nor does it necessarily stop in response
to a reduction in financing; it is the result of the quality of the policy
mix put in place for a long period oftime (Camdessus 1987). It is with
this perspective in mind that the interrelationships between the debt
strategy and economic growth should be contemplated.
Notes
The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily rep-
resent the position of the International Monetary Fund.
1. In only four years, from 1978 to 1982, the three largest countries-Ar-
gentina, Brazil, and Mexico-more than doubled the size oftheir nonfinancial
public-sector deficits, which rose from the already high levels of around 6
percent of GDP to well over 15 percent.
2. For a different view, see Fischer (1986, 3). Fischer thinks that the rise in
the ex ante real rate ofinterest was one ofthe major causes ofthe debt crisis.
3. IMF, World Economic Outlook, February 1987, p. 37.
4. For a discussion on the importance of resource efficiency see Guithln
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5. For a discussion of the major conceptual and methodological problems,
see Maciejewski (1983, 491).
6. See Sourrouille (1987) for a discussion ofthe need to fight inflation without
lowering real wages.
7. For a discussion of the power of interest groups, see Mueller (1986).
8. "Policymaking by conviction vis-a-vis policymaking by the inevitability
ofit all." This is the way Adolfo Diz, in a personal conversation, characterized
this situation.
9. Foranexcellentdiscussionofoptionsfor newdebtinitiatives, see Feldstein
et al. (1987).
10. For a discussion of this topic, see Dornbusch (1986).
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Evolution of the International Debt Challenge
This is no time to mince words. What today, at the inception ofour
work, have we found? Well, in the first place, we see an impenetrable
and colossal fogbank ofeconomic opinions, based upon premises of
fact which have changed so rapidly as to make the bulk ofthem seem
worthless, even if they were in agreement. With all due respect to
the great ability of those experts who have wandered through this
gloomy labyrinth, they could not have failed to come out in the
opposite direction. They were confronted with the necessity offind-
ing stable conditions where no conditions were stable.
In general, we have failed to find much value in economic argu-
ments based on what ought to be instead of what is.
These are the words of Charles Dawes in Paris on January 14, 1924,
when he opened the meeting ofthe Committee ofExperts that became
known as the Dawes Committee. At the time, Germany had defaulted
on its World War I reparation payments, and France and Belgium had
senttroops into the Ruhr. The British hadtakenexceptiontothe French
and Belgian action, while the Germans threw up their hands and simply
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And so Dawes was called to head a nongovernmental Committee of
Experts to solve an apparently intractable situation. Well, by agreeing
to stabilize the German economy (making what today the IMF would
call structural adjustments), extending the time for reparations, and
relating it to the German economy's ability to service the debt, Dawes
developed a policy consensus that was implemented.
Today the question of repayments and debt service in each heavily
indebted country involves both economic and political problems. And
a permanent resolution necessitates a compromise between the eco-
nomics and the politics, along the lines ofexpediency, which recognizes
the real essentials ofboth. Again, Dawes's words summarizing his view
of the situation after World War I may strike you as appropriate for
today's challenges in resolving the overhang of international debt:
In negotiating settlements of such a nature, men ofofficial position,
endeavoring to avoid offense to public opinion, tend to advocate
proposals sacrificing economic principles for temporary political ob-
jectives, while economists, on the other hand, in applying economic
principles tend to disregard existing public sentiments, which how-
ever prejudiced, ignorant, or temporary at first, must eventually de-
termine the fate of the settlement.
These strike me as rather statesman-like words from a man who only
a few years before had actually been the Comptroller ofthe Currency
of the United States. Many people have forgotten that.
Let me talk about the evolution of the debt challenge. In August
1982, the international financial community was virtually paralyzed
with fear. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and indeed Yugoslavia appeared
on the brink of economic collapse. Although our European friends
might not believe it, we in the United States were quite concerned
about Yugoslavia.
In Toronto in September 1982, the mood of the meeting of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and World Bank was almost universally
morose. Fear was widespread that the world's banking system would
collapse, bringing an implosion ofcredit, then trade, and ultimately an
inevitable worldwide depression.
Today we find ourselves in a different, rather improved world. Con-
sensus has been reached on many points, yet the long-term solution is
not evident, as real growth in the industrial countries appears fragile.
I shall ignore the origins ofthe problem, as they are well understood
and chronicled. Indeed, I think Jeff Sach's paper (see above) was
excellent on that point. Rather, I would like to review what I believe
are the four phases ofthe debt problem's resolution and analyze some
potential ideas that, with additional work, may have merit.
The four phases of the debt challenge that I have observed begins
with Phase I, which was characterizedby a crisis mentality and concern307 Developing Country Debt
over liquidity. This was late 1982-83. Phase II was the period in which
industrialized and developing countries alike came to grips with what
had to be done to stabilize and strengthen the world financial system.
That began sometime in 1983 and continued into the beginning of 1984
perhaps. Phase III, the period when orthodoxy and conventional so-
lutions were applied with limited success and new approaches began
to emerge, is where I would suggest we are today. Phase IV is, quite
frankly, the next twenty-five years, when the problem will be resolved
and be only of historical interest.
As Wilfred Gutt, the former chief executive of Deutsche Bank ob-
served, in the life of every banker there is one event that leaves a
permanent mark. For this generation ofbankers that event appears to
be the international debt crisis. Let's examine the management ofthat
crisis, or challenge, as I prefer to call it.
PhaseI: liquidity squeeze andcrisis mentality. Throughout the spring
and summer of 1982, the u.s. Treasury and the Federal Reserve had
been concerned about the international debt situation. In the spring of
1982, the U.S. Treasury held a series ofmeetings with Mexican officials
and repeatedly requested, but never received, an in-depth analysis of
their economic and reserve situation or at least consultations with the
then Lopez-Portillo Administration. Inaddition to Mexico, a very close
watch was kept on Yugoslavia where the situation was deteriorating.
And the Argentine debt situation was becoming critical as events led
to the Malvinas conflict.
The debt crisis is usually considered to have begun on Thursday,
August 12, 1982, when Mexico's newly appointed Finance Minister
Silva-Herzogcalled the U.S. Treasury to say Mexico would completely
exhaust its foreign exchange reserves by the following Monday. The
next day, the Finance Minister flew to Washington. Over an intensive
weekend (that I think might meet Mike Blumenthal's test of a period
ofexigency), the U.S. government arranged to prepay $1 billion in oil
shipments for the strategic petroleum reserve, provide $1 billion to
Mexico in CCC guarantees, and the Treasury, the Federal Reserve,
and the BIS agreed to bridge loans totaling $1.85 billion, until Mexico
could develop an approved economic adjustment IMP program.
Mexico squeezedby, buta crisis mentality among international bank-
ers developed almost immediately. International confidence in the abil-
ity of the largest developing countries to service their debts had been
dealt a staggering blow. With its vast oil reserves, Mexico had been
considered among the most creditworthy of the developing nations.
And I suspect that most people in this room would have shared the
view that oil would go to $50 a barrel by now.
Within three weeks, the financial world was shaken again by similar
problems in both Brazil and Yugoslavia. In Argentina the economic
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countries had encountered severe debt-servicing problems involving
moratoria, extraordinary financing, forced reschedulings, and the ne-
cessity for an IMF program.
I think Phase I can be characterized first by the fact that there was
an extreme liquidity problem for the debtors. Although their long-term
economic prospects may have been positive, the sudden constriction
of international lending caused a major shortage of hard currency for
many developing countries. The so-called rollover assumption was
shattered.
A second characteristic was the atmosphere of impending crisis.
Genuine fear ofa collapse of the banking system and subsequent col-
lapse oftrade and worldwide depression permeated the financial com-
munity. These fears were overblown and exaggerated by a press that
did not understand the implications of the problem at first. I cannot
overstate the morose atmosphere at the Toronto Bank-Fund meetings
in September 1982.
The third characteristic of this phase, frankly, was a lack of global
experience in dealing with such problems. Financial institutions and
government leaders simply had not dealt with problems of this mag-
nitude and number. No one fully understood the nature and dimensions
ofthe problem. There was simply no briefing book, collectedjudgment,
or historical precedent.
Phase II: coming to terms with the challenge. By February 1983, the
monetary system had reached the brink and was coming back. Phase
II had begun. Substantial progress had been made in settling the fi-
nancial problems ofkey debtor countries, and our knowledge and un-
derstanding of that problem had increased dramatically. Plus, confi-
dence had been restored so that we knew the world's financial system
would not immediately collapse.
At the same time, G-I0 agreed to a U.S. proposal to modify and
expand the IMF General Agreement to Borrow (GAB). This was de-
signed to serve as a standby borrowing arrangement for the IMF in
emergency situations, which might threaten the stability ofthe system.
For the first time there would be a safety net for the international
financial system.
I might stop here for a second and say that I think this is an often
overlooked event by the historians and the economists. There was no
authorization to use the GAB for anything other than developed or
industrialized countries who had balance of payments problems prior
to this change. That fund is now available to assist a developing or
developed country who gets into trouble because of an inability to
service debt. There was no safety net at the beginning, now there is.
It mayor may not ultimately be used or be adequate, but at least a net
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Also by February 1983, ourknowledge and understanding ofthe debt
problem had improved. A process for handling the debt problems in-
volving the IMF, the BIS, creditorgovernments, bank regulators, bank
advisory groups, and debtor governments was emerging. I would say
a fair characterization of the process would be to say that it was ad
hoc, disorderly, poorly articulated, and minimally adequate. Indeed, I
think that Charles Schultze's comment this morning that it was "mud-
dling through" was probably fairly accurate.
Nonetheless, confidence had been restored. Indeed, the IMF meet-
ings in 1983 were virtually upbeat by comparison to those in Toronto.
I think Phase II can be further characterized by what I call "country-
specific" crises, or"mini-crises." Everydeadline ona loanin a country
seemed to bring a new problem. More country-specific problems erupted
around the quarterly performance reviews at the IMF. Each of these
were country-specific problems, not systemic threats, as in Phase I.
Each was solved. And, I suggest that in the years ahead it's safe to
predict that there will be more country-specific challenges. And they,
too, will be managed.
A third characterization of Phase II was the rise and fall of ideas,
such as a debtor's cartel or calls for global solutions. Debtor countries
have come to realize thateachcountry's situationis unique andrequires
a unique, appropriate domestic solution. In addition, developing coun-
tries, especially the newly industrializing ones, realize that their pros-
pects for future growth are enhanced by continued cooperation with
industrialized countries and the banking community rather than by
confrontation and acrimony.
Similarly, global bailout schemes also emerged and declined in Phase
II. These schemes, like the so-called debtor's cartel, failed to recognize
the uniqueness of each debtor's situation and the importance of con-
tinued involvement and cooperation by creditor banks and govern-
ments on an individual country basis.
Key concepts were developed in Phase II. In 1983 some of these
concepts emerged with the announced five-point U.S. strategy for re-
solvingthe international debtproblem. This program consistedofadop-
tion of policies by industrialized governments to promote sustained,
noninflationary growth, encouragement of sound economic policies
within debtor countries to allow them to live within their resources,
strengthening Qf international financial institutions, encouragement of
continued commercial bank lending, and continued willingness to pro-
vide bridge financing where necessary.
Phase III: convention and orthodoxy. Phase III has lasted from mid-
1984 to the presenttime. This has beencharacterizedby the application
of conventional approaches or orthodox solutions for the debt chal-
lenges by the indebted countries, the IMF, and the commercial banks.310 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
Probably the apex ofthis phase was the 1985 announcement of the
Program of Sustained Growth at the IMF meeting in Seoul. This was
a more positive and better articulation of the earlier five-point U.S.
program. While sound from a policy objective standpoint, the so-called
Baker initiative has simply not been implemented to date.
Further, the required preconditions of sustained, noninflationary
growth and open markets for LDC exports are now, I believe, drawn
into serious question. The Reagan Administration's trade actions have
been mixed at best. By my own standards the Reagan Administration
has been basically protectionist and inconsistent with its LDC debt
strategy.
In addition, during this phase, as Sachs correctly points out, thefree-
rider syndrome-which has been mentioned by both Tony Solomon
and Bill Ogden (see above)-has become quite acute among the small
and regional banks. For example, but for the recent Brazilian an-
nouncement ofa moratoria, the bank steering committee system would
have probably collapsed because ofthe free-rider process and its cum-
bersome nature. That system plus the syndication process are proving
increasingly cumbersome, ineffective, and perhaps simply unsustain-
able in their present form.
For example, 90 percent of the banks in the Brazilian syndicate
provide only 5 percent of the money. And as Eduardo Wiesner (see
above) pointed out quite correctly, the time lags between political con-
sensus and the actual funding are increasing rather than de-creasing.
And, ofcritical importance to the developing countries and their ability
to effectively implement change, political resolution must be followed
by action. The current Mexican case is a perfect example ofthis prob-
lem when you consider the lag between the time the IMF-endorsed
policy change was agreed to and the time the bankfunding will actually
take place. As that time lag is increased, the ability to affect policy
change is reduced.
Last,·during Phase III there have been tentative signs that the World
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank may begin to playa
more active and forceful role in promoting policy-oriented and struc-
tural adjustment loans. Again, while the increased role of the MDBs
is welcomed and necessary, I think it's questionable whether they will
move quickly enough or effectively enough. And while they are a
promising source ofnew financing, their future role is unclear and their
response very uncertain.
Indeed, the U.S. position in the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) as to the voting rights question has raised serious questions
among Latin American countries as to whether the United States is in
fact committed to an increase in IDB resources for structural adjust-
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basic U.S. policy objectives. All were rejected by Jim Baker. As a
result ofhis actions, questions have been raised as to whether there is
in fact a U.S. intention to push for the additional money in Congress
or whether politically it's simply better to say "we couldn't reach a
deal, so I didn't come up to Congress to ask for money." Indeed, the
U.S. position was met with open cynicism in Miami. Read this week's
Economist if you'd like a rather scathing review of the U.S. position
on the IDB voting rights question. I think we are in an unfortunate
situation.
As the recent Mexican loan package and the current Brazilian sit-
uation suggest, and as others have mentioned, debt fatigue is affecting
all the parties. Capital flight and pessimism over economic policymak-
ing are reinforced by the debt overhang. Few can see this currentPhase
III either as sustainable for many years to come or as solving the
problem.
Indeed, canall the indebted middle-income countries always produce
a trade surplus and continue net transfer of-resources abroad indefi-
nitely? Hardly not.
And on the horizon I suggest that the pending oil shock ofthe 1990s,
while temporarily helping the oil-exporting LDCs, will in the current
environment make the orthodox strategy ineffectual. International trade
and world economic growth will suffer.
Let'sconsidersome numbers so we have a backgroundfor the energy
threat that is very near upon us. Every $1 increase in the price of a
barrel of oil costs the oil-importing LDCs some $1.3 billion in foreign
exchange. And there's a general assumption that you'll have higher
interest rates with higher energy prices because of monetary policy
responses. A 1percentrise in interestrates is approximately $2.6 billion
in additional foreign exchange to these countries.
So assume that oil were to rise from its current $15 + level back to
about$30-a$15-a-barrelincrease-butassume that interestrates only
went up by 5 percent. The aggregate increase in LDC debt service
would be $32.5 billion in addition to what they currently owe, on an
annual basis. Let me suggest that this will certainly focus everyone's
attention on the unsustainability ofthe present situation. The increase
in interest rates would obviously offset any gains to the oil-exporting
LDCs. '
In short, new initiatives are needed to augment or supplement the
case-by-case approach. To date we've only bought time, but we have
no present solution.
Phase IV: the evolved process. The evolution of the debt challenge
to date does offer some encouragement that new and more·innovative
approaches will ameliorate the difficulties of rescheduling and adjust-
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feasible, negotiable, or to command a political consensus. Still the
variety ofnew proposals indicates that reform and ultimately progress
will continue to be made.
I would submit that there are nine points ofgeneral consensus:
1. Sustainable, noninflationary growth in the industrialized countries
is a prerequisite.
2. Liberalized trade in both industrialized and developing countries
must take place.
3. Moderate interest rates and realistic exchange rates must prevail.
4. Developing countries must have a positive inflow ofnet new capital.
5. Net new capital flows to developing countries must be invested
in productive investments, not used for consumption or transfer
payments.
6. Maturities ondebtmustbe restructuredintoa realistic debt-service
burden for those indebted countries.
7. Direct investment, debt-equity swaps, mutual funds, and other
devices can all contribute to easing the short-term payments burdens
and to stimulating economic activity.
8. Repayment in local currencies, interest capitalization, and similar
schemes should all be judged by whether they will increase net new
capital flows into productive investments. That is, if in fact they ulti-
mately result in a decrease of net new capital flows, then they are
inadequate schemes.
9. Domestic debt considerations will in fact have great influence on
the industrialized countries' policies. One need only think of the Jap-
anese national railway debt or the Farm Credit System in the United
States and the interplay in our respective parliaments and congresses
to see that there will not be any type ofmassive public subsidy ofthe
debt. Indeed, the one point I would most strongly disagree with in Jeff
Sachs's paperwould be on the question ofso-called debt relieffor even
the most extreme countries.
If what I have proposed is an accepted consensus (and it may well
not be), then some recent developments suggest the outline of some
events for Phase IV, which, again, I believe will last for twenty-five
years.
Firstis thegrowth ofdomestic political pressures within the indebted
countries. The political reality of rescheduling is that each indebted
country must be able to show that it received as good or better terms
than the most recently rescheduled loan. For example, the Philippines
can point to its new package as being better than Mexico's 1986 re-
scheduling. In time, in my judgment, Brazil will undoubtedly do better
still. Banks will have lower margins and fewer incentives to lend new
money. This domino orcontagion effect ofextended maturities, length-313 Developing Country Debt
ening grace periods, and local currency substitution on notes will all
continue to rationalize the existing maturities and promote longer term
syndicated loans orbond issues often, fifteen, even twenty-five years.
Second, the securitization ofexisting debt is beginning. A very thin
secondary marketis developing. Swappingofsovereign debtfor project
finance bonds is also beginning and offers good encouragement. The
Philippine Investment Notes (PINs) provide a way for smaller banks
to exit the syndication system and promote local investment. Mutual
funds utilizing sovereign country debt to invest in local companies are
being carefully studied and generally endorsed by debtor countries and
investors alike. Indeed, those ofyou who have seen today's Wall Street
Journal know that the Bank of Montreal has proposed a $100 million
Brazilian mutual fund converting its debt.
Third, new options are being proposed that meet all the parties'
needs. For example, one that I think deserves study (it's not new) is
a split-currency interest rate to provide local capital. In this scheme,
a rate of interest would be established that reflects a country's ability
to pay, which conceivably could be below market rate; let's assume
half of the market spread owed LIBOR. The difference between this
rate and the market rate would be paid in local currency. This local
currency interest rate payment would then be optionally relent to either
the governments or the IDB, ADB, or World Bank to provide local
counterpart funds for local projects. Again, recall that one reason for
the decline in World Bank and IDB project lending is the lack ofthese
funds.
The repayment terms on these local currency counterpart funds would
coincide with the payment terms of the principle debt. These loans
would be interest bearing. To avoid a foreign exchange loss to the
commercial banks, these local currency loans, as well as the interest
on the relent interest (that is, the part that is sent back for counterpart
financing), could be indexed to the U.S. dollar or some other con-
vertible currency and repaid by the debtor country in dollars at ma-
turity, well into the future.
Let me say that I think people now realize that bank insolvency may
not be substantially reduced from what it is today. The LDC debt
problem for the banks is a funding or liquidity problem, not an ac-
counting problem. So long as a bank can borrow profitably (that is,
have an adequate spread either in the depositor market, the inner bank
market, CDs, or international capital markets), it can tolerate the ex-
istence ofloans that do not pay interest. Obviously, the higher a bank's
asset quality, the better is its opportunity to manage its liabilities, that
is, it can have longer term liabilities and be at the lowest rate over
Treasuries or have an adequate spread to continue to make a profit.314 J.D. Sachs/A.M. Solomon/W.S. Ogden/E. Wiesner/R.T. McNamar
So the term and spread over Treasuries can be better maintained, and
the banks can fund themselves when they have higher asset quality.
By contrast, many analysts suggestthatthe money-centerbanks have
already been discounted in the capital markets and that a further dis-
position of LDC debt will only injure their reported earnings, not fur-
ther erode their bond ratings or funding costs. I'm sure there would
be some erosion. I'm sure there would be some increase in funding
cost or loss of ability to raise new capital.
Butthink aboutit. While the money-centerbanks inthe UnitedStates
today sell for about 40 percent ofthe price-earnings ratio ofthe Stan-
dard & Poor's 500, they're still able to raise capital and tolerate losses
on LDC debt. I think this may, in some respects, suggest why you see
a hardening of attitudes on the banks' parts. They're able to tolerate
the losses and can increase their reserves. Remember, banks' reserves
are counted as part of primary capital by a commercial bank.
Interest rate spreads and commissions will continue to narrow whether
the banks like it or not. Commissions in 1982 were running 1.0-1.5
percent. By Mexico's 1984 rescheduling, it was 0.63 percent. And I
don't hear a lot of talk about commissions today. Spreads have gone
little less than 2.0-2.5 percent in 1982 to Mexico's 1984 rescheduling
of 1.5 percent. Now we're down to the famous 13/16 percent. And the
Philippines asserts it's doing a little better than that. I'm not sure I
quite understand that, butI'm sure that it can be packagedfor domestic
consumption in Manila as being better than 13/16 percent. And again,
I'm willing to predict that Brazil will ultimately find one way oranother
to come in at better than 13/16 percent.
The bank earnings from rescheduled loans are therefore going down,
lowering return on LDC assets. As this happens, alternatives to re-
deploy these assets look more and more attractive to the banks. This
is why you see the mutual fund proposal from the Bank of Montreal,
a willingness to underwrite and participate in PINs, growth of swaps
in Chile, and so on.
Let me say that I agree with Tony Solomon's view that the banks
are incapable of a proactive solution where they come up with a pro-
posal. They are basically going to continue to be in a reactive mode.
I think, though, that time has brought a certain maturity to the bankers,
to the IMP's understanding, to the World Bank, and certainly to the
United States and other creditor governments.
And I also think there is some maturity in the debtor governments.
I think that we will see exit vehicles for the smaller banks. I would
hope that the World Bank in its structural adjustment lending will try
to work with the IMF. However, I'm not encouraged by the current
Mexican program. I have to tell you I'm quite disappointed in it. I
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together there can only be described as a pious hope, as opposed to a
comprehensive program. That does not bode well.
One last comment: when people talk about u.s. government lead-
ership, as Bill Ogden did, let me suggest that there is a background or
set ofcriteria against which that leadership should bejudged. It's very
clear, or it should be very clear, that the IMF quota increase in 1983
was almost not passed by the U.S. Congress, despite the fact that it
had been widely criticized internationally and by the banks as being
inadequate in size. The United States has been too niggardly in terms
of the access levels on the quota and other matters.
At the U.S. Treasury we found we were dealing with senators like
the one who told us that the loan on his motel had been cancelled by
his bankerin a local small town because the bankertold him he'drelent
the money to big money-center banks, and they'd loaned it to Mexico,
and he couldn't get it back. Well, I suggest there were probably other
factors involved, but I don't know them. I do know I did not get his
vote on the quota increase. And he's still there.
Let me suggest that you have to look at any ofthese global solutions,
like an interest rate subsidy or an interest rate guarantee or anything
else, in terms ofthe real politics ofthe United States. You have to look
at it against the fact that we are currently having difficulty getting a
replenishment of FISLC, our savings and loan guarantee fund. The
analysis that I have personally participated in and have seen suggests
that as of the third quarter last year, a minimal number for FISLC
would require $35-$40 billion of new money-minimal. The Admin-
istration is pushing $15 billion, yet the Congress is talking $7.5 billion.
We are noteven addressing the problem. We can'teven raise the money
for a domestically supported program.
One must see debt release schemesfor LDCs against the background
ofthe current House Majority Leader's call for forbearance among the
Texas savings and loans. You have to see it against the energy loans
to the Texas, Louisiana, and Colorado banks, because I think the ar-
gument that there is a liquidity problem on these loans but that they're
really good long term, because oil is going to be $30 or $40 a barrel,
has a frightening parallel to the LDC situation. So I think it will be
difficult, realistically, to expect the United States to continue to reduce
its fiscal deficit, which we all agree it should, and at the same time to
increase its subsidies, guarantees, orcash outlays on any type ofglobal
debt forgiveness scheme.
My conclusion is that it will take a variety ofpartial solutions acting
in concert to "muddle through" Phase IV. Or we will need another
Charles Dawes to provide a new consensus where neither economists
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Summary of Discussion
Schmidt stated that progress can be made on the LDC debt problem
only if the United States takes the initiative. He reiterated his belief
that the Baker plan is a prophecy which the U.S. Treasury has yet to
fulfill. Debtors will not be able to pay back the loans at face value;
therefore, additional support must beforthcoming from eitherthe IMF,
the U.S. Congress, or a new international institution. In case this sup-
port is not forthcoming, banks should be setting aside reserves in
anticipation ofa substantial write-down.
Petty expressed the view that international financial cooperation be-
tween bankers, creditor governments, and international institutions
occurs as the fear offailing grips them. To date, much more could have
been done on the LDC debt issue. The Paris Club could have used
reschedulings as an opportunity to offer more concessional terms, for
example. Anthony Solomon agreed that the Paris Club has been nig-
gardly, adding that it has offered no more leadership than the com-
mercial banks themselves. Petty then suggested that guarantees on
World Bankdebt, which currently coveronly principal, couldbe legally
extended to coverinterest instead. Asymmetric SDR allocations to the
LDCs could be used to finance these countries and to encourage ad-
ditional purchasesfrom the developed countries. The debt problem will
not be resolved in an international environment of slow growth.
Ogden concurred that leadership has been lacking and expressed
disappointment that the U.S. government has not been more aggres-
sive. The Bundesbankrequired West German banks to use the proceeds
they earned on theirrediscounts to supplementtheirloan-loss reserves.
He thought it unlikely the Federal Reserve Board would mandate such
a farsighted policy. Ogden found the inaction ofthe United States even
more disappointing because a leadership role would not be very costly.
For a time, the banks were close to setting a positive example with
Brazil. A little bit of U.S. leadership would have gone a long way in
helping to bring Brazil back into the international capital market and
in persuading banks to resume voluntary lending. In view of Brazil's
economic vitality, it is unfortunate that irresponsible Brazilian state-
ments and policies were allowed to push the resumption of voluntary
lending stillfurtherinto the future. Ogden also expressedconcernabout
the difficulty of keeping smaller banks involved in repeated refinanc-
ings. He felt this to be another area in which stronger government
leadership would make a difference.
Carli argued that the huge U.S. capital account surpluses made find-
ing additional financing for LDCs much more difficult. The $4 billion
or $5 billion made available to LDCs pales in comparison with the U.S.317 Developing Country Debt
external borrowing requirements of$150 billion. As long as the United
States absorbs so much ofworld savings, there is little opportunity for
other countries.
Sachs pointed out that the discussion had focused on the financial
implications of the debt for developed countries and had ignored the
perspective of the debtor countries. From the point of view of the
banks and creditorgovernments, the debt problem revolves around the
question of whether the debts would be resolved without banks as-
suming large losses. But from the perspective of the LDCs, the debt
problem has meant five years of misery: per capita income has fallen
20 percent, public services and infrastructures have deteriorated dras-
tically, energy production is insufficient, and many public-sector cor-
porations are bankrupt. Sachs argued that many proposals are simply
financial band-aids and that the actors involved should be actively
considering plans ofselective debt relief. Bolivia had perhaps the most
severe hyperinflation of the century: its terms of trade had fallen 20
percent with the collapse oftin and gas prices, and it was on the brink
of complete financial collapse. Nevertheless, the IMF expected con-
tinued adherence to its program. This would have required Bolivia to
funnel 60 percent of government revenues into debt service to banks.
The IMF backed down, at last, but the incident indicates that bankers
or IMF officials will continue to be surprised when defaults occur. The
ultimate outcome could be a period of generalized debt moratoria.
Sachs summarized empirical evidence that bank stocks were already
discounted to reflect the price at which LDC loans are trading in sec-
ondary markets. A government-backed institution could purchase the
debt from banks at current rates without a further loss to bank stock-
holders and give an enormous break to the debtors.
Feldstein held a different viewfrom Sachsontheability ofthedebtors
to service the existing debts. He felt it was important to distinguish
between larger countries, such as Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, and
some ofthe smaller ones, such as Bolivia and Peru. It is reasonable to
be optimistic that these larger countries can maintain payments large
enough to hold the nominal value ofthe debtconstant, butsmall enough
to allow for substantial increases in growth. He emphasized that po-
litical problems arise when different countries are treated differently.
De facto, the Bolivias and the Perus will be allowed their conciliatory
defaults. This kind ofpolicy on the partofthe banks is much less likely
to be contagious to other debtor countries than a policy that officially
condones such actions.
Wiesner disagreed with Sachs by saying that it was wrong to take
the precrisis per capita level as the base for comparisons, since that
particular base was not sustainable or realistic. Those high levels had
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flows and by unsustainable fiscal deficits. To put it simply, these coun-
tries had been living beyond their means. The worst thing that could
happen to Latin America was to come out of the debt crisis believing
that wrong domestic policies had not been the principal source of its
tribulations.
Petty reacted to the idea ofdebt reliefproposals by pointing out that
it is difficult to forecast the reaction ofmarkets to a write-down ofthe
debt to the levels at which it is traded in the secondary markets. He
did not agree with Sachs's contention that the discount in bank stocks
is completely attributable to the banks' LDC portfolios. Real estate,
oil, and energy-related loans also have not performed well and con-
tribute substantially to the present discount in bank stocks. Petty was
skeptical that the U.S. government would ever guarantee the bonds of
an institution charged with the responsibility of buying up LDC bank
debt.
Ogden responded to Sachs by observing that Brazil's growth rate of
8 percent in 1985 and 1986 qualified it to resume borrowing, but that
the irresponsible actions ofits finance minister did not. He emphasized
that the cases ofBrazil and Bolivia should not be lumped together. The
IMF's persistence in Bolivia was absurd, he felt, and the banks will
write off the Bolivian debt. Similarly, banks will take a loss in Peru. If
we are to avoid a bad outcome, other small countries, such as Ecuador,
will need help from both creditor governments and banks.
Sachs went on to say that missing in the discussion ofthe case-by-
case approach is the point that the banks and the IMF may agree to
write off the debt, but they seem unwilling to forgive it, even in the
case of Bolivia. We sacrifice Bolivia because we are worried about
Brazil. This goes against the case-by-case approach to debt relief. He
emphasized that de facto forgiveness is not the same as de jure for-
giveness. Only with the latter do the debtors have the chance to be
discharged from bankruptcy.
Greenspan viewed the case-by-case approach as a poor way ofplan-
ning for bad outcomes. If the Brazilian situation were to collapse,
serious fiduciary questions would arise ifbank stockbecame worthless.
Insufficient attention has been paid to the question of what we would
do if widespread default actually occurred.
Anthony Solomon agreed that some de facto forgiveness will be re-
quired, but could understand why the banks have not yet moved in
this direction. The banks do not underestimate the political bandwagon
effects of country-specific debt relief. He called Sachs's emphasis on
granting dejureas well as'de facto forgiveness almost ideological: even
with complete de jure relief, Bolivia would not be cleansed of its rep-
utation as a bad debtor.319 Developing Country Debt
Frenkel underscored Feldstein's earlier point that Brazil and Bolivia
should not be mentioned in the same breath. He was skeptical about
the likelihood ofa doomsday scenario. When Brazilannounceditwould
not pay, Argentina, Chile, and the Philippines were quick to complete
their financing agreements: the domino effect may in fact go the other
way. On the issue ofde facto and dejure forgiveness, he stressed that
the key issue is the degree to which capital markets have memory.
Capital markets that function well are likely to have good memory.
Ruggiero agreed with Solomon that a radically different strategy is
notreally needed. Muchofthe necessary structuraladjustmentin LDCs
has already been achieved. Further advances for the debtors will be
contingent on three things. First, more growth in the industrialized
countries is necessary if the debtors can hope to grow out of their
debts. Second, in order for LDCs to take advantage of the higher
growth, free trade must not be compromised. Third, the debtors will
require further liquidity, and this must be made available. Currently,
the banks and creditor governments have not found a way to guarantee
the flow of credit. Each participant should not pretend that the re-
sponsibility of solving the problem lies elsewhere. The risks offailure
go beyond narrow economic considerations: many LDC democracies
may be lost if the problem is not properly resolved.
McNamarexpressed uncertaintyabout the possibilityofdetermining
how much of the discount at which bank stocks trade is attributable
purely to LDC debts. Whatever the discount, whether banks can con-
tinue to fund themselves, given their current asset structures, remains
a good question. He noted that bond rating services seem to have
discounted the bad debts accordingly. McNamar also stressed the need
for greater foresight in dealing with reschedulings. Over the next two
years, Brazil is scheduled to transfer $15-$20 billion to the banks. It
is in the interest of all the major players to replace the bunching of
payments with a smoother repayment flow.
Fischer remarked that several improvements in the debt situation
had not beenmentioned. First, real interest rates have come downfrom
the onset of the crisis in 1982. Second, banks have made substantial
adjustments by building up their balance sheets. Third, LDCs have
dramatically improved their currentaccounts andbalance ofpayments.
The problem is that these changes may not be sustainable and do not
constitute a long-term strategy for the debt overhang. He argued that
a third party, such as the IMP or a creditor government, needs to take
the initiativefor a comprehensive restructuring. Lookingaheadtwenty-
five years, we certainly don't want development to be financed pri-
marily by short-term floating rate debt. This implies that any voluntary
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bonds. Though debt-equity swaps are small flows, they will cumulate
over time. But for many countries, these instruments will not be enough,
and official flows must make up the difference. Such a change in the
nature ofLDC financing can be made only ifbetter ways ofmonitoring
LDC policies and imposing conditionality can be found, so that today's
problems don't recur. Fischer also noted that the 20 percent reduction
in per capita income of some of the debtors is measured since 1975,
well before the debt crisis. In any case, a fall in real income should
not be confused with the fall in absorption mentioned by Eduardo
Wiesner.
Richardson suggested that we might use debt concessions to nego-
tiate for trade consensus. The developed countries could insist on more
restrictive rules governing the treatment of services, particularly in-
tellectual property. The United States might askfor concessional treat-
ment of U.S. multinationals in Mexico or Brazil in return for more
generous debt relief.